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I. INTRODUCTION 
The public debate in the U.S. surrounding the C.I.A.’s drone program 
in Pakistan has largely concerned itself with the legality of the American 
aerial bombing campaign.1 In particular, the question of whether drone 
1. The legal controversy surrounding drone strikes is multi-faceted. A great deal
of the legal controversy regarding the U.S.’s drone program and targeted killing policy 
has centered on the absence of declassified and publicly available information about the 
program, and the public’s right to know. See, e.g., Margaret Sullivan, Editorial, Questions 
on Drones, Unanswered Still, N.Y TIMES, Oct. 13, 2012, at SR12, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/14/public-editor/questions-on-drones-unanswered-
still.html?_r=0 (enumerating the numerous factual and legal questions that remain 
unanswered about the US’s drone program); Naureen Shah, Obama Has Not Delivered 
on May’s Promise of Transparency on Drones, GUARDIAN (Aug. 17 2013),  
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/aug/17/obama-promise-transparency-
drone-killing (“[T]he question of whom the United States believes it can kill in drone 
strikes remains, as it ever was, full of unknowns.”); Ryan Goodman & Sarah Knuckey, 
Why Drones Are Just a Sideshow, ESQUIRE (Feb. 28 2013),  
http://www.esquire.com/blogs/politics/drones-congress-terror (arguing that publicly 
disclosed information on the drone program has “largely ignored some of the most 
troubling aspects of the U.S. killing program. U.S. officials are still yet to clarify or 
disown leading newspaper reports that ‘military aged males’ killed in the proximity of 
some aerial strikes have been counted as ‘militants’ absent exonerating evidence.”); Ryan 
Goodman & Sarah Knuckey, What Obama’s New Killing Rules Don’t Tell You, ESQUIRE 
(May 24, 2013), http://www.esquire.com/blogs/politics/obama-counterterrorism-speech-
questions-052413#ixzz2nKNtmmDC (“President Obama outlined rules for the conduct of 
lethal operations abroad . . . . Many hoped this moment would herald a new era of 
transparency. To be sure, these steps bring clarity to some issues. But, the framework he 
presented also raises some troubling questions and leaves important older questions 
completely unanswered.”). Another aspect of the debate has centered on whether it is 
lawful under the U.S. Constitution. See, e.g., Complaint at 2, Al-Aulaqi v. Panetta, No. 
12-cv-01192-RMC (D.D.C. filed July 18, 2013), available at  
http://ccrjustice.org/files/July-18-2012-Nasser-Al-Aulaqi-Complaint.pdf (complaint 
bringing federal lawsuit against senior C.I.A. and military officials for authorizing the 
strikes that killed three United States citizens, Anwar Al-Aulaqi, his sixteen year-old son 
Abdulrahman Al-Aulaqi and Samir Khan in Yemen in 2011. Petitioners, the families and 
estates of the deceased alleged, inter alia, violations of their rights under Fifth 
Amendment Due Process Clause, and Fourth Amendment for unreasonable search and 
seizure). Finally, there is debate as to whether the U.S. drone program comports with 
international human rights and international humanitarian law.  See, e.g., Malik Noor 
Khan vs. Federation of Pakistan through Governor Khyber Pakhtunkhwa & 05 others, 
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strikes violate Pakistan’s sovereignty has been debated.2 President 
Obama has affirmed that U.S.’s military engagement is grounded in 
(Argued Apr. 11, 2013) W.P.No. 1550-P/2012, Writ Petition No. 1551-P/2012 (Argued 
Apr. 11, 2013) (SC Peshawar) (Pak.) (“That the drone strikes, carried out in the tribal 
areas (FATA) particularly North & South Waziristan by the CIA & US Authorities, are 
blatant violation of Basic Human Rights and are against the UN Charter, the UN General 
Assembly Resolution, adopted unanimously, the provision of Geneva Conventions thus, 
it is held to be a War Crime. . . .”) (lawsuit brought by family members of deceased and 
survivors of drone strikes seeking Pakistani authorities to put an end to the U.S. strikes 
and provide redress victims); Rosa Brooks, The Real Reason the Limits of Drone Use Are 
Murky: We Can’t Decide What ‘Terrorists’ or ‘Conflict’ Mean, THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 20, 
2013),  
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/08/the-real-reason-the-limits-of-
drone-use-are-murky-we-cant-decide-what-terrorists-or-conflict-mean/278739 (arguing 
that there current debates regarding the legality of the U.S.’s drone program stem from a 
foundational disagreement as to whether the US is engaged in legal armed conflicts in 
Pakistan and Yemen where strikes take place, and who constitutes a combatant); Vicki 
Divoll, Op-ed, Drone strikes: What’s the law?, LOS ANGELES TIMES (Feb. 17 2013), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/feb/17/opinion/la-oe-divoll-drones-hamdi-20130217 
(discussing legality of US targeted killing program in the context of Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 
542 U.S. 507 (2004), which recognized the right of U.S. citizen detainees to challenge 
their detention); UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Killings, Philip Alston: Record 
AfPak Drone Attacks Under Obama May Violate International Law, DEMOCRACYNOW! 
(Oct. 28 2009),  
http://www.democracynow.org/2009/10/28/un_special_rapporteur_on_extrajudicial_killi
ngs (interview with former Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Killings, Philip Alston, 
who argued that US government’s use of Predator drones may violate international law); 
UP with Chris Hayes: The Legal, Political Arguments for Drones (MSNBC television 
broadcast Feb. 10, 2013), available at  
http://video.msnbc.msn.com/up/50760344 (segment featuring Hina Shamsi of the 
American Civil Liberties Union, journalist Jeremy Scahill, Jennifer Daskal, professor of 
law at Georgetown University and Richard Epstein, professor of law at New York 
University). 
2. See, e.g., Chris Woods, CIA Drone Strikes Violate Pakistan’s Sovereignty,
Says Senior Diplomat, GUARDIAN (Aug. 2, 2012),  
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/aug/03/cia-drone-strikes-violate-pakistan 
(Wajid Shamsul Hasan, the high commissioner to London and one of Pakistan’s top 
ambassadors stated that drone strikes are a “ clear violation of our territorial sovereignty 
and national integrity.”). But see, Neha Ansari, Drones Not a Violation of Our 
Sovereignty, EXPRESS TRIBUNE (July 23, 2013),  
http://tribune.com.pk/story/580923/drones-not-a-violation-of-our-sovereignty (arguing 
that drone strikes do not violate Pakistan’s sovereignty). 
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“‘respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity.’”3 Yet, Pakistani 
officials protest against these strikes as infringement on its territory.4 
Nonetheless, leaked documents reveal a public relations charade 
orchestrated by the Pakistani leadership to protest the strikes in public, 
and but not to interfere in private, because of popular opposition to drone 
strikes. 5  Still, the US strikes appear to create routine diplomatic rows 
  
 3. See, e.g., Obama, Sharif Discuss Security Cooperation, Drones, RADIO FREE 
EUROPE RADIO LIBERTY (Oct. 24, 2013), http://www.rferl.org/content/pakistan-drones-
sharif-obama/25146267.html. 
 4. Pakistan Summons US Ambassador to Protest Against Latest Drone Killings, 
GUARDIAN (June 8, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/08/pakistan-us-
drone-killings (“Pakistan’s ministry of foreign affairs said the demand for an immediate 
halt to the attacks was repeated on Saturday. ‘It was conveyed to the US chargé d’ 
affaires that the government of Pakistan strongly condemns the drone strikes, which are a 
violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity,’ the ministry said in a 
statement.”). 
 5. See US Embassy Cables: Pakistan Backs US Drone Attacks on Tribal Areas, 
GUARDIAN (Nov. 30, 2010),  
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/167125 (Diplomatic 
cable between U.S. and Pakistan diplomats, dated 23 August 2008, leaked by the 
transparency organization Wikileaks that reveals a conversation between Interior 
Minister Rehman Malik, and the Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani in which “Malik 
suggested we hold off alleged Predator attacks until after the Bajaur operation. The PM 
brushed aside Rehman,s [sic] remarks and said ‘I don,t [sic] care if they do it as long as 
they get the right people. We,ll [sic] protest in the National Assembly and then ignore 
it.’”); US Embassy Cables: XXXXXXXXXXXX PROVIDES GRIM ASSESSMENT OF 
SITUATION IN THE NWFP AND FATA, GUARDIAN (Nov. 30, 2010),  
http://www.theguardian.com/world/us-embassy-cables-
documents/185598?guni=Article:in%20body%20link (“XXXXXXXXXXXX said he 
wanted to say in an unofficial capacity that he and many others could accept Predator 
strikes as they were surgical and clearly hitting high value targets.”); See also Greg 
Miller & Bob Woodward, Secret Memos Reveal Explicit Nature of U.S., Pakistan 
Agreement on Drones, WASHINGTON POST (Oct. 23, 2013),  
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/top-pakistani-leaders-secretly-
backed-cia-drone-campaign-secret-documents-show/2013/10/23/15e6b0d8-3beb-11e3-
b6a9-da62c264f40e_story_3.html (“Despite repeatedly denouncing the CIA’s drone 
campaign, top officials in Pakistan’s government have for years secretly endorsed the 
program and routinely received classified briefings on strikes and casualty counts, 
according to top-secret CIA documents and Pakistani diplomatic memos obtained by The 
Washington Post.”). 
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between the two countries,6 highlighting their precarious arrangement. 
But, the narrow debate over whether a few Pakistani officials, at one 
point the past nine years said “yes” eclipses more fundamental questions 
of about the contours of the consent doctrine in ongoing bilateral 
arrangements governing the use of force. Namely, how should the law 
weigh the legitimacy of these agreements, when challenged across 
branches of government and by the public at large, as in Pakistan’s case? 
And, where ought the law set the threshold for coercion in bilateral 
agreements, in the face of evidence of duress and differences in 
bargaining power between the states involved, such as between the US 
and Pakistan? The controversy over Pakistan’s involvement in the U.S.’s 
drone program offers a fertile case study through which to explore 
questions of coercion and legitimacy, and the role of each in the law of 
interstate force. Where we demarcate the contours of the consent 
doctrine ultimately reflects a negotiation of two competing discourses in 
international law—equality and hierarchy. In other words, how seriously 
we account for the possibility that one state may have been coerced into 
an agreement, and how seriously we consider its unpopularity is 
indicative of whether we are concerned with ensuring inter-state equality, 
and it’s close cousin, the promise of self-determination. As I argue, the 
arguments supporting a finding of continuing consent by Pakistan ignore 
these considerations. 
Modern international law has since its inception been pulled in two 
opposing directions. Amongst other things, it has simultaneously 
promoted the equality of all sovereign states, while also preserving 
hierarchies between stronger and weaker states, which has had 
significant consequences for individuals’ right to self-determination. The 
debate over whether the strikes encroach on Pakistan’s sovereignty 
  
 6. See, e.g., Nick Paton Walsh & Nasir Habib, Pakistani Leaders Condemn 
Suspected U.S. Drone Strike, CNN WORLD (Mar. 21, 2011),  
http://www.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/asiapcf/03/18/pakistan.drone.strike/index.html 
(“Pakistan’s Foreign Ministry summoned the U.S. ambassador Friday to protest a drone 
strike as the death toll from that attack rose to 44, Pakistani intelligence officials 
said….The drone strike follows the controversial release of CIA contractor Raymond 
Davis, a U.S. agent acquitted of the double murder of two Pakistani men in Lahore after a 
total of $2.3 million was paid to the relatives of his victims.”); Pakistan Summons US 
Ambassador to Protest Against Latest Drone Killings, supra note 4. 
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captures this internal tension. On the one hand, there are important 
indicia of consent, and a U.S. administration that insists its activities 
respect Pakistan’s sovereignty.  But, a close examination of the law of 
interstate force and the evidence available on the U.S.—Pakistan 
bilateral agreement governing drone strikes invites reconsiders the worth 
of this presumed consent. As I argue, to find affirmative consent in the 
face of the full cauldron of facts effectively reduces principles of 
sovereign equality and self-determination to formalisms. Doing so 
replicates real inequalities between states in the fabric of the law. Such 
an adjudicative step is consistent with broader trends in international law, 
in which the norms of sovereign equality and self-determination has been 
compromised and limited in scope. Such trends have the consequence of 
magnifying inter-state inequalities, rather than regulating and reducing 
them, by cementing the power of stronger states.  
This article situates itself at the intersection of two separate fields of 
inquiry. This article draws and hopes to contribute to an existing 
literature on the unique legal interpretations marshaled to explain and 
justify U.S. armed activities in the Global War on Terror and 
operationalize its global hegemony. While there is a great deal of work 
on the erosion of sovereign equality generally, and on how the law has 
served legal hegemony broadly, there is little attention to the nexus of the 
two—how sovereign equality is negotiated by the US as it pursues its 
foreign policy.  This article seeks to illuminate the set of legal arguments 
put forth to support the US’s armed activities in Pakistan, and their core 
assumptions and misconceptions with regard to sovereign equality. 
Additionally, this article also contributes to the multi-disciplinary 
literature on the nature of US-Pakistan relations by injecting a critical 
legal analysis of current bilateral relations. Indeed, drone strikes are the 
latest chapter of longer history of U.S. involvement in Pakistan, in which 
it has secured or supported domestic political arrangements favorable to 
the U.S.’s position and activities during the Cold War, and then during 
the Global War on Terror.7  
  
 7. Even if the bilateral relationship is now considered rocky, and Pakistan 
accused of duplicity, it ought to be properly viewed in the context of a long history of 
successive governments, both democratic and military executing the policy wishes of the 
U.S. government. The very accusation of duplicity suggests the expectation that another 
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II. BACKGROUND  
Since 2004, there have been almost 400 drone strikes in Pakistan.8 
Most strikes are concentrated to the Federally Administered Tribal Areas 
(FATA) of Pakistan. Since its beginning, the drone program, both the 
front on—the internal U.S. decision making process for waging war—
and the back end—the human impact of these strikes has been mired in 
deliberate secrecy and opacity.9 From 2004 to 2011, there was no official 
explanation for these strikes. In recent months, speeches from the Obama 
administration officials and Obama himself provided some clarifications 
regarding the administration’s legal basis for using lethal force. Still, a 
great amount remains unknown about the government’s internal decision 
making process for determining targets, its strategic rationale, the 
  
sovereign state is bound to remain faithful to another state and its agreements, even if it 
trumps its own best interests.  
 8. Get the Data: Drone Wars, THE BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM,  
http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/category/projects/drones/drones-graphs/ (last  
visited July 20, 2014).  
 9. For example, the ACLU and news organizations, such as the New York 
Times have filed numerous Freedom of Information Act requests for information relating 
to the U.S. drone program, but their requests have been repeatedly denied by the 
executive agencies holding this information. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. U.S. Dep’t 
of Justice, 915 F. Supp. 2d 508 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (holding that the government did not 
violate FOIA by refusing to disclose information relating to targeted killing of persons 
tied to terrorism). In one request for information relating to the legal and factual basis for 
the U.S.’s use of predator drones to conduct “targeted killings” overseas, filed by the 
ACLU in 2010 with the Department of Defense, the  
Department of Justice (including the Office of Legal Counsel), the Department of State, 
and the CIA, the Departments of Defense, Justice, and State responded by releasing some 
records and withholding others. The CIA by contrast responded by refusing to confirm or 
deny whether the CIA drone strike program even exists, issuing what is known as the 
Glomar response. This position was challenged by the ACLU in the District Court for the 
District of Columbia, but the court upheld the agency’s determination. See Am. Civil 
Liberties Union v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 808 F. Supp. 2d 280 (D.D.C. 2011) rev’d sub 
nom. Am. Civil Liberties Union v. C.I.A., 710 F.3d 422 (D.C. Cir. 2013). In March 2013, 
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed the trial court’s finding in 
favor of the CIA ruling that the CIA could no longer deny its interest in the program. The 
case has been remanded to the District Court, where the CIA has been ordered to produce 
responsive documents, and if not legal justifications for their continued withholding. See 
Am. Civil Liberties Union v. C.I.A., 710 F.3d 422 (D.C. Cir. 2013).  
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diplomatic negotiations with countries impacted by strikes, and the 
number that have died from the strikes. 10 A full assessment of the drone 
program is beyond the scope of this paper, but most pertinent to the 
discussion is an overview of the government’s articulation of questions 
of interstate force. 
The U.S. government has put forward two sets of legal 
rationalizations to justify its engagement in hostilities around the world 
after September 11th, including the drone program.11 It has asserted the 
need for self-defense against Al Qaeda and associated forces, as well as 
the existence of armed conflict with the Taliban and its associated forces. 
Hostilities in Afghanistan fall into the latter legal paradigm. And, in 
recent months, the Obama Administration has clarified that drone strikes 
in Yemen are not pursuant to an armed conflict, but is governed by the 
law of self-defense. It is unclear under which legal paradigm each target 
in Pakistan falls, as some militant groups that appear to be targeted are 
  
 10. U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion 
and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering 
Terrorism, ¶ 46, U.N. Doc. A/68/389 (Sept. 18, 2013) (“In the United States, the 
involvement of CIA in lethal counter-terrorism operations in Pakistan and Yemen has 
created an almost insurmountable obstacle to transparency. . . . Similarly, the conduct of 
covert targeting operations by United States special forces under the auspices of the Joint 
Special Operations Command is almost invariably classified.”); id. ¶ 47 (“[T]he United 
States has to date failed to reveal its own data on the level of civilian casualties inflicted 
through the use of remotely piloted aircraft in classified operations conducted in Pakistan 
and elsewhere, or any information on its methodology for evaluating this.”). 
 11. La Laurie Blank has illustrated how Obama administration has used both 
armed conflict, as well as self-defense, to justify its strikes without ever firmly 
committing to one paradigm in Pakistan in particular. Such vacillation, she argues, has 
served to obscure the weakness of each justification and left the public guessing as to 
which justification applies, since both cannot apply at the same time.  
See Laurie Blank, Blurring the Legal Lines on Targeted Strikes, JURIST (Feb. 1, 2012), 
http://jurist.org/forum/2012/02/laurie-blank-targeted-strikes.php (“The US may be 
seeking flexibility in using both legal justifications at the same time without careful 
delineation. Flexibility has its benefits, to be sure. But the failure to engage directly with 
the tough issues that lie at the heart of the distinction between where a state is acting as 
part of an armed conflict and where it is acting solely in legitimate self-defense against a 
terrorist or other threat is, ultimately, a wasted opportunity to promote greater 
development in the law going forward.”). 
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allegedly connected to hostilities in Afghanistan,12 while others not 
directly.13  
On the issue of interstate force, the Obama administration has 
maintained that the frequent strikes conform to international law,14 and 
respect Pakistan’s sovereignty.15 By contrast, the Pakistani government 
has stated that these strikes violate its sovereignty.  The American media 
frequently assumes that the Pakistan government has provided 
meaningful consent, by providing authorizing in back channels but 
protesting in public.16  
As I will argue, drone strikes must be viewed in the context of a 
complex history of bilateral relations. Successive Pakistani governments 
have sought to fashion themselves into reliable allies of the U.S. 
government for geopolitical advantage, to offset the perceived Indian 
  
 12. This category of groups includes the Haqqani Network, a semiǦautonomous 
component 
of the Taliban. It operates both in the eastern provinces of Afghanistan, and the border 
region of South and North Waziristan in Pakistan. See generally Anand Gopal et al., 
Inside the Haqqani Network, FOREIGN POLICY GROUP (June 3, 2010) 
http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/06/03/inside_the_haqqani_network_0.  
 13. In contrast to the Haqqani Network, the Tehrik-e- Taliban Pakistan does not 
have a sustained record of collaboration with the Afghan Taliban. Its militant activities 
are directed at Pakistani state targets and civilians. See generally Hassan Abbas, A Profile 
of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, CTC SENTINEL 2 (Jan. 2008), available at  
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/CTC%20Sentinel%20-
%20Profile%20of%20Tehrik-i-Taliban%20Pakistan.pdf. 
 14. See John O. Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Sec. and 
Counterterrorism, Remarks at Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 
Assistant (Apr. 30, 2012), available at  
http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/04/brennanspeech (entitled “The Ethics and Efficacy 
of the President’s Counterterrorism Strategy”) (“[I]n full accordance with the law—and 
in order to prevent terrorist attacks on the United States and to save American lives—the 
United States Government conducts targeted strikes against specific al-Qa’ida terrorists, 
sometimes using remotely piloted aircraft, often referred to publicly as drones.”). 
 15. See Obama, Sharif Discuss Security Cooperation, Drones, supra note 3. 
 16. See, e.g., Ken Dilanian & David S. Cloud, U.S. Seeks New Bases for Drones 
Targeting Al Qaeda in Pakistan, LOS ANGELES TIMES (Feb. 16, 2014),  
http://www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-drone-bases-
20140216,0,2170648.story#ixzz2tWnvZzIy (“Pakistan consents through back channels, 
while formally protesting the strikes in diplomatic forums and at the United Nations.”). 
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threat.17 In some ways, the Pakistan—U.S. relationship is a paradigmatic 
patron client relationship, one that is defined by “dependence based on a 
mutual exchange of favors between two parties with an unequal 
distribution of resources.”18 The U.S. has regularly exploited this access, 
permitting it to carry out a series of interventions, whether diplomatic or 
armed, by relying on Pakistan’s intercession. From arming the mujahidin 
the repel the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, with strong U.S. backing in 
the 1980’s, to capturing, detaining and rendering men with suspected 
links to terrorism in the U.S.’s Global War on Terror, there is a pattern of 
collaboration, with Pakistan acting as regional proxy for the U.S. The 
Pakistan military has continually benefited from this arrangement, 
getting much needed international support for staging recurrent military 
coups as well as aid. There are important incidents that have frayed 
relations that reveal a lack of bilateral coordination, such as the discovery 
of the Osama Bin Laden’s in the town of Abbottabad, Pakistan, or the 
rogue CIA officer, Raymond Davis who killed two Pakistani civilians. 19 
But, the historically close relationship between the two states has bred a 
proclivity for clientism in Pakistan’s military and civilian governments, 
and an aversion to direct confrontation and or a permanent freeze in 
relations, when interests do not align.20 This continuing legacy helps to 
  
 17. See generally TARIQ ALI, THE DUEL: PAKISTAN ON THE FLIGHT PATH OF 
AMERICAN POWER 196-204 (2008) (discussing attempts by each generation of Pakistan’s 
leaders from Mohammad Ali Jinnah, Pakistan’s founder and first prime minister (1947-
1948) to General Ayub Khan, military president (1958-1969) through Zulfikar Ali 
Bhutto, civilian prime minister (1973-1977) to persuade US officials of Pakistan’s loyalty 
in return for military aid, defense agreement, and a strategic counterweight to India).  
 18. Christophe Jaffrelot & Ashley J. Tellis, Containing or Engaging Pakistan? An 
 American Dilemma, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE (Nov. 18, 
2011),  
http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/11/18/containing-or-engaging-pakistan-american-
dilemma/7m5s. 
 19. In January 27, 2011, CIA contractor Raymond Davis killed two civilians in 
Lahore. He was arrested but eventually released in March of 2011, conditioned on 
compensating the victims’ families. Later that year, on May 2nd, 2011, the U.S. Navy 
captured Osama Bin Laden from a compound in Abottabad, Pakistan, which prompted a 
diplomatic row after suggestions that Pakistan had been protecting Bin Laden, despite an 
international manhunt. 
 20. See generally ALI, supra note 17. 
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explain the peculiar posture both countries have adopted with regards to 
the U.S. strikes.  
III. A LIMITED EQUALITY  
To better understand how sovereign equality is being contested in the 
legal debates over Pakistan’s consent to drone strikes, it’s worth 
exploring how sovereign equality has been construed historically in 
modern international law.  
The guarantee of equality between sovereign states is a foundational 
aspiration in international law, and yet it has been consistently 
unfulfilled. Equality has always been contested and negotiated, just as it 
is being redefined in the current moment between the U.S. and Pakistan 
over the use of interstate force.  
At once emancipatory, modern international law placed all states on 
the same footing, accountable to the same laws. Yet, in practice, 
international law has not prevented stronger states from exerting their 
will against weaker states and their people, its institutions have 
reinforced interstate inequality, and been silent to subtler forms of 
imperialism and hegemony. Both sovereign equality and self-
determination, the two key units of the analysis here, suffered from 
international law’s accommodations to stronger states, although in 
different but interrelated ways. 
The persistence of sovereignty in modern international law as a notion 
worth defending was itself a concession made by early advocates of 
international human rights. A more radical vision of international human 
rights that failed to carry the day envisioned a moral order resting on the 
fulfillment of certain obligations to rights bearing individuals unmediated 
by the nation state.21 And yet, even the compromised vision of an 
international order rooted in sovereignty, that was settled on partly 
because it was deemed more realistic, has never be able to be realized.  
  
 21. See Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia, 178-211 (2010) (narrating the 
reincorporation of state sovereignty by international human rights in the early 20th 
century seeking to establish the field and this new area of law despite an avowed 
commitment to right bearing subjects and self-determination). 
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In what follows, I try to outline the broad contours of this dialectic 
relationship between equality and hierarchy in the fabric of the law, and 
the consequences of this kind of dynamic for weaker states in our global 
order and their inhabitants.  
A. Defining Equality 
Sovereign equality can be broken into its constituent components. 
“[S]overeign equality refers to a distribution of a bundle of immunities, 
rights and privileges, capable of being exercised at the level of the 
law.”22 The principle of equality itself has three manifestations according 
to Jerry Simpson; it exists in the formal sense, at a legislative level, and 
at an existential level.23 Our discussion of the consent doctrine implicates 
all three dimensions of sovereign equality. Each is discussed in turn.  
1. Formal Equality 
Formal equality is the equality accorded to states before judicial 
organs of the international legal system. Specifically, it is the idea that: 
[N]o state can be barred on the basis of its status from bringing a claim 
in international law that its rights have been violated, and in bringing 
such a claim international law that it’s rights have been violated, and in 
bringing a claim the state will be treated equally before the law.24 
Nonetheless, despite formal equality, states may have varying 
capacity to enforce those rights. Under international law, self-help is the 
primary mode of enforcement, in contrast to domestic law that relies on 
courts. “Self-help is dependent on the vagaries of power, will and 
capacity. Larger states have a greater capacity to vindicate their legal 
claims through the projection of power than do their smaller 
counterparts.”25 Thus in so far as self-help is a central institution of 
  
 22. GERRY SIMPSON, GREAT POWERS AND OUTLAW STATES 39 (2004). 
 23. Id.   
 24. Id. at 43. 
 25. Id. at 46. 
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international law, “there can be significant variance in the actual rights 
possessed.”26 This reality similarly conditions Pakistan’s involvement 
and reaction to the US’s drone program in its territory, as will be 
discussed in next sections. 
2. Legislative Equality  
In addition to formal equality, Simpson identifies a second form of 
equality, legislative equality. “The most important ingredient of 
sovereign equality has long been the power of States to participate in the 
creation of their legal obligations and not to be subject to rules to which 
they have not agreed.”27 Legislative equality confers validity onto the 
law, such that rules of conduct and rights govern the community of states 
only if each state consents to their enactment. 28 Nico Krisch notes that 
the principle was interpreted as requiring that each state consents to the 
laws governing them, and that each state have equal capacity to consent 
to laws, regardless of their content.29 But paradoxically, “[s]tates can 
contract out of equal relations by virtue of the prime facie equality they 
already possess.”30 Equality was thus reduced to a procedural safeguard 
rather than a substantive norm that mandated certain minimum 
commitments.31 This narrowing of consent in the legislative process 
  
 26. Id. at 44. 
 27. Nico Krisch, More Equal that the Rest? Hierarchy, Equality and US 
Predominance in International Law, UNITED STATES HEGEMONY AND THE FOUNDATIONS 
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 142 (Michael Byers ed., 2003); See also S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. 
Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7) (“The rules of law binding upon States . . . 
emanate from their own free will . . . .”); See Louis Henkin, INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
POLITICS AND VALUES 27 (1989) (“State consent is the foundation of international law. 
The principle that law is binding on a state only by its consent remains an axiom of the 
political system, an implication of state autonomy.”). 
 28. Id.
 29. See Krisch, supra note 27, at 138.  
 30. See SIMPSON, supra note 22, at 44.  
 31. See Krisch, supra note 27, at 139; See Catriona Drew, The East Timor Story: 
International Law on Trial, 12 EUR. J. INT’L. L. 651, 667 (2001) (identifying a trend in 
the international legal system that favors procedural requirements over substantive 
principles). 
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mirrors the same in the bilateral negotiations, such as agreements relating 
to the use of force, which will be discussed in the next sections. 
In addition, the principle has suffered from a limited scope of 
application in international law bodies and mechanisms. A stronger 
version of the principle would also encompass equally weighed voting 
and representation in decision-making processes within international 
legal bodies.32 However, the institutions of international law carve out 
special law making powers afforded to stronger states, such those 
accorded to the five permanent members of the U.N Security Council. 
Simpson terms these privileges afforded to stronger states as instances of 
“legalized hegemony,” which undermine the realization of true 
legislative equality.33  
In conveying greater decision-making power to stronger states, in 
particular, to the Great Powers, there is a noted tendency for those more 
powerful states to use their position to enforce a view of the law that is in 
their favor.  For example, the: 
United States has used its position on the Security Council to prohibit 
other states from using force, such as in the conflict between Bosnia-
Herzegovnia and between Eritrea and Ethiopia, whereas it has 
expanded the opportunities for itself. These increased opportunities in 
conjunction with its military superiority means that it can take 
advantage of these opportunities for political and military reasons.34 
The U.S. has tried to reserve the right to define self-defense and has 
done so in expansive ways,35 and yet in its position on the Security 
Council it has limited other states from asserting self-defense.  
3. Existential Equality  
The third type of equality that Simpson identified is existential 
equality. Simpson identifies the norm by its offense, namely the “legal 
  
 32. SIMPSON, supra note 22, at 44. 
 33. Id. at 52-53. 
 34. See Krisch, supra note 27, at 149. 
 35. Id.  
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hierarchies that operate as modes of exclusion or that classify states 
according to culture or civilization or democracy rather than power . . . 
existential equality, then, is the foundation of a pluralist conception of 
international legal order.”36 In other words, that each state has right to 
organize its internal matters in the way it sees fit. It encompasses the 
right to territorial integrity, political independence and the right to 
participate in the international system.  
The corollary of these three rights according to Simpson is the “norm 
of non-intervention and the right to choose one’s own form of 
government free from external interference.”37  
The concept of existential equality shares important links with the 
concept of self-determination. The right to self-determination has 
“always been bound up more with notions of sovereignty and title to 
territory than what we traditionally consider to be ‘human rights.’”38 
Indeed, from both precepts, we derive the norm of non-intervention. 
However, “the connection between sovereignty and self-determination 
has generated relatively little comment in legal doctrine.”39 But, as will 
be shown, more expansive notions of self-determination have important 
consequences for how we conceptualize sovereign equality. By 
consequence, the foreshortening of existential equality has significant 
implications for the right to self-determination, and its scope of 
application.  
First, briefly some contours to this right.40 The status of self-
determination in international law is unclear. Arguments have been made 
  
 36. See SIMPSON, supra note 22, at 53. 
 37. Id. at 54. 
 38. Matthew Saul, The Normative Status of Self-Determination in International 
Law: A Formula for Uncertainty in the Scope and Content of the Right?, 11 HUM. RTS. L. 
REV. 609, 628 (2011). 
 39. Id. at 631. 
 40. Id. at 625 (identifying a debate in international law as to whether self-
determination is a legal rule of legal principle and arguing that it is both. “[T]he position 
that it is both a legal principle, which posits that ‘[p]eoples must be enabled freely to 
express their wishes in matters concerning their condition’, and serves as an umbrella 
principle for a collection of more specific legal rules, seems accurate.”). Self-
determination is also considered by some scholars to be a fundamental principle of 
international law which informs the development of 
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that it is jus cogens.41 It is also recognized in the International Covenant 
for Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which has been signed and 
ratified by Pakistan and the US. Article 1 of ICCPR: “All peoples have 
the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely 
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social 
and cultural development.” At its most basic level, the right is said to 
accord people the ability to “determine their political status and freely 
pursue their economic, social and cultural development.”42 However, 
there is no resolution on which groups count as peoples and the contents 
of the right that such peoples enjoy.43 And, the obligations imposed on 
the international community and its member states towards fulfilling the 
rights have been nominal, in part because the norm of self-determination 
has remained vague.44 In the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion on Western Sahara, 
self-determination was construed as a right conferred on peoples to a 
particular process to give shape to their particular national aspirations.45 
But the ICJ left the contours and substance of that right to the General 
  
other aspects of international law. See REIN MÜLLERSON, ORDERING ANARCHY   
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 166 (2000). 
 41. See Saul, supra note 38, at 634. 
 42. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 1, Dec. 
16, 1966, S. Treaty Doc. No. 95-19, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
 43. See Saul, supra note 38, at 611; United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization, International Meeting of Experts on the Further Study of the 
Concept of the Rights of Peoples, ¶19, U.N. Doc.  SHS- 89/CONF.602/7 (1989),  
available at  
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0008/000851/085152eo.pdf. §23-24 (providing some 
guidance on what characteristics of a group engender a people with a right to self-
determination). See also JAMES SUMMERS, PEOPLES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: HOW 
NATIONALISM AND SELF-DETERMINATION SHAPE A CONTEMPORARY LAW OF NATIONS 373 
(2007) (discussing whether Article 1 of the International Covenant on Cultural and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) entitled distinct peoples the right to democratic government.). 
 44. See Saul, supra note 38, at 632. 
 45. Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 12, ¶ 70 (Oct. 16), available 
at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/61/6195.pdf [hereinafter Western Sahara] (“In short, 
the decolonization process to be accelerated which is envisaged by the General Assembly 
in this provision is one which will respect the right of the population of Western Sahara 
to determine their future political status by their own freely expressed will.”). 
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Assembly to define,46 while recognizing that the right ought to be 
exercised through “informed and democratic process.”47  
The notion that people can choose to self-govern, generally in the 
form of a nation state, gaining international recognition is characterized 
as external self-determination. Whereas internal self-determination is the 
range of political entitlements within the state granted to its citizens.48 
Generally, international instruments have been concerned with external 
self-determination, and the international community has not sought to 
mandate “the realization of internal self-determination within existing 
states.”49 
In the context of decolonization, (external) self-determination was 
tantamount to Simpson’s definition of existential equality, including “the 
right to exist—demographically and territorially—as a people;” “the 
right to territorial integrity;” “the right to permanent sovereignty over 
natural resources;” “the right to cultural integrity;” and “the right to 
economic and social development.”50  
But self-determination can mean more than the existential equality of 
states.51 Suggestions have been made that the internal dimension to self-
determination mandate that states be democratic,52 and not merely be 
  
 46. Id. ¶ 71 (“The right of self-determination leaves the General Assembly a 
measure of discretion with respect to the forms and procedures by which that right is to 
be realized.”). 
 47. Id. ¶ 57. 
 48. See Saul, supra note 38, at 614. 
 49. Id. at 637. 
 50. Catriona Drew, The East Timor Story: International Law on Trial, 12 EUR. J. 
INT’L. L. 651, 663 (2001). 
 51. But see id. at 658 (“Beyond colonialism, the right of self-determination is 
plagued by an excess of indeterminacy both in terms of scope and content.”). 
 52. Western Sahara, supra note 45, at ¶ 57. See also Drew, supra note 50, at 662 
(discussing UN practice of organizing plebiscites and referendums in the decolonization 
context as a concrete mechanism by which the will of the people has been given 
expression in formal nation building processes). But see Jure Vidmar, The Right of Self-
Determination and Multiparty Democracy: Two Sides of the Same Coin? 10 HUM. RTS. 
L. REV. 239, 268 (2010) (arguing that the right self-determination does entail the right to 
democratic governance). 
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limited to a procedural right.53 Self-determination defined in this way 
would be significant shift from the nominal and negative commitments it 
requires. This interpretive shift would find kinship in more expansive 
notions of existential sovereignty, namely the notion of popular 
sovereignty.54 Popular sovereignty forges an explicit link between two of 
international law’s foundational principles. Popular sovereignty alters the 
traditional formulation of sovereignty, one that is predicated on a 
government’s effective control over a particular territory. Popular 
sovereignty, by contrast, posits that a government’s authority emanates 
from the people.   
Self-determination can thus provide grounds “for arguing that popular 
sovereignty has now been legalized.”55 Both principles mandate that a 
people, however defined, collectively and independently control and 
manage their own affairs and territory. However, this conceptualization 
of popular sovereignty, and its linkage with self-determination is not 
firmly established in international law.56  
Just as internal self-determination may require democracy, popular 
sovereignty similarly imagines that people are endowed with a 
continuous right to “freely determine their political status and freely 
pursue their economic, social and cultural development, and, in so doing, 
provides an ethically more convincing explanation for sovereignty, than 
the traditional explanation based on effective control of territory.”57 Such 
a conceptualization of sovereignty finds support in Article 21(3) of the 
U.N. Declaration on Human Rights, which states, “[t]he will of the 
people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be 
  
 53. Drew, supra note 50, at 665 (noting the tendency to elevate self-
determination as a process over self-determination as substance). 
 54. There is support for the notion that popular sovereignty has been legally 
recognized as a human right. See Universal Declaration on Human Rights, G.A. Res. 
217A (III)A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217 (III), at 21(3) (Dec. 10, 1948) (“The will of the 
people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in 
periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall 
be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.”). However, popular 
sovereignty is not the conventional construction of sovereignty. 
 55. Saul, supra note 38, at 628-29. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 629 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal 
and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free 
voting procedures.”58  Thus, existential sovereignty, in its more 
humanistic and expansive iterations, could thus recognize not merely the 
right of a state’s right to self-rule, but also, the right of its peoples to 
manage their affairs within that state without external interference and 
consonant with their own wishes. A military coup or unpopular policies 
would thus violate popular sovereignty.59 Thus, defined, existential 
equality would guarantee equality of people across and within states. It 
could thus provide a safeguard against state clientism, the existence of 
puppet regimes, or other arrangements in which the formal 
representatives of one state are unaccountable to the people they 
ostensibly serve.  
And yet, at times these norms of self-determination and existential 
sovereignty can also be in conflict. For example, if a more expansive 
notion of self-determination required a democratic form of government,60 
it would undermine the international community’s pluralism that has 
been deemed normatively desirable. A more expansive construction of 
self-determination might also tolerate foreign interference within that 
country so long as it promoted democracy.61 The designation of outlaw 
  
 58. Universal Declaration on Human Rights, supra note 54. 
 59. W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary 
International Law, 84 AM. J. INT’L L. 866, 872 (1990) (“International law is still 
concerned with the protection of sovereignty, but, in its modern sense, the object of 
protection is not the power base of the tyrant who rules directly by naked power or 
through the apparatus of a totalitarian political order, but the continuing capacity of a 
population freely to express and effect choices about the identities and policies of its 
governors. . . . In modern international law, sovereignty can be violated as effectively and 
ruthlessly by an indigenous as by an outside force, in much the same way that the wealth 
and natural resources of a country can be spoliated as thoroughly and efficiently by a 
native as by a foreigner. Sovereignty can be liberated as much by an indigenous as by an 
outside force. As in the interpretation of any other event in terms of policy, context and 
consequence must be considered.”). 
 60. See Saul, supra note 38, at 631. 
 61. Steven R. Ratner, The United Nations in Cambodia: A Model for Resolution 
of Internal Conflicts?, in ENFORCING RESTRAINT: COLLECTIVE  
INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL CONFLICTS 267 (Lori Fisler Damrosch ed., 1993). See also 
W. Michael Reisman, Humanitarian Intervention and Fledgling Democracies,  
 
478 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 23.2 
 
or pariah states within the international legal order, and its subsequent 
military interventions, in Kosovo and in Afghanistan, under the banner of 
humanitarianism, exemplify instances in which pluralism and the norm 
of non-intervention have been subordinated to an aggressive neo-
liberalism, which imagines and forcefully imposes a particular internal 
domestic order on other states.62 
Depending on how we construe the principles of existential equality 
and self-determination, their relationship towards each other can shift, 
and as will be shown in Pakistan drone case study. Conventionally, both 
have been construed narrowly and formally. But, more expansive 
interpretations of self-determination can engender significant changes in 
how we understand sovereignty.  
4. (In)equality of Influence 
As has been illustrated, formal, legislative and existential equality 
have all been undermined by various compromises, exceptions and 
bloodspots within the fabric of the law and its derived institutions. 
Additionally, material inequalities between states impede with the 
realization of these norms. Nothing in international requires material 
equality of states.63 And, the persistence of material inequalities cuts at 
every level in international law. As detailed in the earlier discussion 
about formal equality, in a system largely based on self-help, 
  
18 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 794, 796, 804-05 (1995) (“It is encouraging that the 
international community, as a whole, has made a clearer commitment to democracy, and 
that so many actors have come to the realization that democratic government enhances 
protection of human rights and reduces the likelihood of aggression. . . . A corresponding 
doctrine of unilateral humanitarian intervention to prevent or reverse violations of the 
fundamental human right to popular government continues to be less certain, as if this 
right were somehow less important or urgent than other rights. . . . Democracy is a right 
guaranteed by international law and the condition sine qua non for the realization of 
many other internationally prescribed human rights. Democracy may also be the sine qua 
non of international peace, for the evidence is mounting that democratic countries do not 
attack each other. Democracy will not take root in many new states if outsiders do not 
commit themselves to doing what is necessary to sustain it. The doctrine of humanitarian 
intervention allows such action.”). 
 62. See SIMPSON, supra note 22, at 197-222. 
 63. See id. at 56. 
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“inequalities in the capacity to affect legal solutions or to exact 
compliance with legal norms” are inherent.64 Stronger states will have 
greater capacity than weaker states to vindicate their rights, despite the 
equality of their entitlements in theory. Similarly, legislative equality is 
eroded by the inequalities of influence that certain states enjoy over 
others in the law making process. These permissible “[i]nformal 
applications of raw power can have an enormous impact on the eventual 
content of legal rules and such influence is impossible to write out of any 
system of governance.”65 Existential equality has equally been eroded by 
strong currents of anti-pluralism, which has emanated from the First 
World and is projected towards smaller states that lie outside of the gates 
of geopolitical power. 
5. Consequences of Unequal Order 
The cumulative consequence of these various forms of inequalities, 
whether formally condoned or simply ignored, is that stronger states can 
violate the law and suffer few repercussions as compared to their weaker 
counterparts.  
This result is in large part due to the reliance on self-help in 
international law as the primary means of enforcement, but is 
exacerbated by the instances of legalized hegemony mentioned earlier. 
Because self help is the means of enforcement, and because states enjoy 
different capacities to enforce their rights, the repercussions of non-
compliance are inherently varied. Indeed, a state whose rights have been 
violated will have to consider whether seeking enforcement or remedies 
for the violation is feasible, and balance the potential negative 
consequences in bilateral relations, and in its position in the international 
community at large. By corollary, a potentially law-breaking state will 
weigh the consequences of non-compliance, but compliance with 
international law is but a factor in a state’s calculus. Where an aggrieved 
state does not resort to self-help or where it is not the appropriate 
measure—for example, the offense is against the international 
  
 64. Id. at 57. 
 65. Id. at 49.  
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community as whole—the most likely outcome is a condemnation. Only 
in exceptional circumstances, does a military intervention take place, as 
briefly mentioned in our discussion of anti-pluralism on behalf of the 
international community.  
In the face of condemnation, stronger states can better sustain such 
violations because there are other significant ways that it can retain its 
status in the world community, independent of the institutions of 
international law, by relying on economic advantage. Stronger states, 
whether economically or militarily are able to survive their own 
violations of international law relatively unscathed. Furthermore, and 
importantly, permanent members of the Security Council can control or 
influence the international community’s reaction to particular violations, 
which creates the chance for inconsistent or self-interested decisions. 
This backdrop puts into view the active tension between equality and 
hierarchy within international law, and the numerous ways in which 
inequality is tolerated or facilitated, through institutional arrangements or 
particular interpretive trajectories. The law thus makes forms of 
imperialism and hegemony possible and lawful. This tendency in the 
application of international law to accommodate power is replicated in 
official U.S. analyses regarding the legality of drone strikes in Pakistan. 
Instead, I hope to offer a corrective that challenges conventional 
conceptualizations of sovereignty, and by consequence self-
determination, and the particular interpretive trajectories detailed above.  
IV. THE LAW OF INTERSTATE FORCE 
Just as within international law more broadly, the reality of intra-state 
inequality remains underappreciated in the literature on the law of 
interstate force. Yet, consent is at the heart of whether one state can use 
force within the territory of another, and inevitably power imbalances 
will undoubtedly affect the conditions under which consent is secured. 
But as will be suggested in this section, the law of interstate force, while 
cognizant of the possibility of coercion, offers little elaboration of its 
contours. Instead, a close factual examination of the U.S.-Pakistan 
arrangement over drone strikes, if there is one at all, can help put into 
view that boundary line between consent and coercion, and as such offers 
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insight into what the law ought to consider if it is to take to issues of 
inter-state inequality and imperialism seriously.  
Similarly, the legitimacy such interstate agreements may or may not 
enjoy domestically, across branches of government and within the public 
at large has also been underappreciated in the law of interstate force, and 
its resultant implications for the right of self-determination. The domestic 
debate within Pakistan surrounding drone strikes exemplifies the crisis of 
legitimacy from which some interstate agreements may suffer, and the 
role of popular dissent is underappreciated in the literature. 
A. Role of the Law of Interstate Force 
First, a brief introduction to the role of the law of interstate force 
within the laws of war more broadly. Under Article 2(4) of the UN 
Charter, states are forbidden from using force in the territory of another 
state. But, there are important exceptions—self-defense being the most 
important one. The law of interstate force helps to determine whether the 
use of force in the territory of another is lawful. It is invoked only where 
neither the states themselves nor groups existing within either state are 
already engaged in a pre-existing armed conflict,66 and determines 
whether outside of an established armed conflict, state X can use force 
within the territory of state Y. This use of force may be against state Y 
itself or groups contained within state Y. Furthermore, the law of 
interstate force judges the legality of such extraterritorial use of force 
only with regards to the rights of the attacked state and its sovereignty.67 
An entirely separate analysis must be conducted to determine whether 
the use of lethal force is permitted against the target(s) in question. The 
states concerned are still obligated to adhere to either human rights law 
or international humanitarian law when using lethal force.68 
  
 66. Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Study 
on Targeted Killings, ¶ 34, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 (May 28, 2010) [hereinafter 
Alston, Study on Targeted Killings] (citing U.N. Charter art. 51.). 
 67. NILS MELZER, TARGETED KILLINGS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 75 (Vaughan 
Lowe, ed., 2008). 
 68. Alston, supra note 1, ¶ 37. 
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B. Consent 
The role of consent within the law of interstate force has been under-
theorized,69 and there is a lack of consensus on how it relates to other 
justifications for the use of force, in particular self-defense.70As Ashley 
Deeks summarizes,  “[i]nternational law today does not clearly prohibit 
states from using consent as a partial or complete rationale for their 
forcible actions in another state’s territory, even where that consent 
purports to authorize an activity that the host state legally could not 
undertake.”71 She argues that states may exploit this ambiguity in how 
the consent doctrine operates, in particular use force in ways that ignore 
domestic laws of the host state in its use of force. Deeks’s concern about 
how ambiguity may be exploited is equally applicable to the present 
discussion.72 
Deeks helpfully provides a review of current thinking on the role of 
consent, which is summarized here; one camp of scholars suggests that 
consent provides an independent basis for the use of force in other state’s 
territory.73 Another camp views consent as only addressing questions of 
sovereignty but insufficient by itself for justifying the use of force.74 
And, yet another camp rejects the use of consent entirely for a particular 
set of circumstances.75 
  
 69. Ashley Deeks, Consent to the Use of Force and International Law 
Supremacy, 54 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 4 (2013). See also MELZER, supra note 67, at 51 (“To 
the knowledge of the present author, however, no detailed analyses have been conducted 
as to potential limits imposed by the law of interstate force specifically on the authority 
of States to consent to targeted killings on their territory . . . .”). 
 70. David Wippman, Military Intervention, Regional Organizations, and Host-
State Consent, 7 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 209, 210 (1996) (stating consent is a well-
established and widely accepted grounds for justifying extraterritorial military 
intervention by one state in the territory of the consenting state, but conceding that the 
theoretical basis for consent is not clear). 
 71. Deeks, supra note 69, at 26-27. 
 72. Id. at 27. 
 73. Id.  
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
2015] The Case of U.S. Drone Strikes in Pakistan 483 
 
Thus in summary, there are at most two circumstances in which lethal 
force can be applied within the territory of another state. 76 Either state X 
consents to state Y using force inside its territory, or state X has not 
consented, but is unwilling and unable to diffuse this threat to state Y and 
thus state Y is acting in self-defense.77 The analysis here focuses on the 
first prong—consent to the application of lethal force within the territory 
of another state, because this is one of the justifications the Obama 
administration relies on for its strikes in Pakistan. The alternative basis 
for lawful interstate force, “unwilling unable,” which is also central to 
the U.S.’s rationale for war is beyond the scope of this article.78 
  
 76. Melzer, supra note 67, at 75 (“UN Security Council authorization is not an 
independent exculpatory clause, but it is based on prior consent of all member States of 
the United Nations as to the extent of the conventional powers bestowed upon the 
Council in the Organization’s Charter. The Security Council cannot lawfully, therefore, 
extend its powers beyond that consent. . . . [A] targeted killing which cannot be justified 
based on an exculpatory clause recognized in international law would fall under the 
peremptory prohibition of aggression.”). 
 77. Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Rep. 
of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, submitted 
in Accordance with Assembly Res. 67/108, transmitted by Note of the Secretary-General,  
¶ 91, U.N. Doc. A/68/382 (Sept. 13, 2013) [hereinafter Heyns Report] (by Christof 
Heyns). Christof Heyns summarizes the unwilling or unable standard and its relationship 
to self-defense. 
(“It has been argued that self-defence against an armed group on the territory of another 
State is permissible only if the host State is unable or unwilling to act against that group. 
This follows from the requirement that action taken in self- defense must be necessary. 
The test of unwillingness or inability can therefore not refer to an independent 
justification for the use of force on foreign soil, but at best constitute part and parcel of a 
claim to self-defense.”). Id. 
 78. Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on 
the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While 
Countering Terrorism, submitted in Accordance with G.A. Res. 66/171 and Human 
Rights Council Res. 15/15, transmitted by Note of the Secretary-General, ¶ 55, U.N. Doc. 
A/68/389 (Sept. 18, 2013) [hereinafter Emmerson Report] (by Ben Emmerson) (“The 
International Court of Justice has held that in the absence of consent the use of force in 
self-defence by one State against a non-State armed group located on the territory of 
another State can be justified only where the actions of the group concerned are 
imputable to the host State. This may extend to situations in which a non-State armed 
group is being harboured by the host State. In this analysis, however, absent such a 
connection, extraterritorial use of force against a non-State armed group in another State 
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Article 20 of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility provides non-
binding guidance on the role and contours of consent in inter-state 
relations. Functionally, consent is an exclusion from liability. If state X 
gives valid consent to state Y to perform a particular act, it precludes 
state X from asserting that the act was wrongful.79 Consent, once 
obtained, makes conduct lawful that would otherwise be unlawful 
without permission.80  
1. Coercion 
The Commentary accompanying the Article as well as the Eighth 
Report on State Responsibility provide some limited insight into the 
impact of coercion in bilateral agreements and how states and tribunals 
have considered the legitimacy of the consenting government, and of the 
content of its agreement. In theory, protections are available to protect 
weaker states, but seem to be rarely invoked. 
Generally, the Commentary leaves it to substantive law—that is the 
law outside of state responsibility to determine whether consent was 
obtained.81 Still, it identifies the possibility of coercion, requiring that 
consent be “valid.”82 The Commentary makes clear that while consent 
may come in many forms, including implicit, it may not be presumed, 
  
is an unlawful violation of sovereignty, and thus potentially an act of aggression, unless it 
takes place with the host State’s consent or the prior authorization of the Security 
Council.”); see also id.  ¶ 56 (“On the other hand, the United States and some other 
countries take the view that, subject to particular conditions, the law of self-defence 
entitles States to engage in non-consensual military operations on the territory of another 
State against armed groups that pose a direct and immediate threat of attack, even where 
those groups have no operational connection with their host State.”). 
 79. See Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts, with Commentaries, 53 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 10, at 72, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 
(2001), reprinted in [2001] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 20, pt. 2, U.N. Doc  
A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/ Add.1 (Part 2) Art. 20 [hereinafter DARS], available at 
http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf (last visited 
Oct. 10, 2014). 
 80. Id. art. 20 cmt. n. 2. 
 81. Id. art. 73 cmt. n. 4. 
 82. Id. art. 20. 
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and it “may be vitiated by error, fraud, corruption or coercion.” 83 The 
Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Executions, Christof Heyns’s most 
recent report on the use of lethal force through armed drones reiterates 
the Draft Articles’ standards.84 Elaborating on its requirements, Heyns 
states that consent need not be public, but it must be “actually 
expressed,” and its parameters must be clearly stated.85  
The example of coercion referred to in the Commentary is the 
occupation of Austria by German troops in March of 1938, which before 
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg. The Tribunal asked 
whether Austria had given Germany consent, and concluded “that 
Austrian consent had not been given; even if it had, it would have been 
coerced and did not excuse the annexation.”86 Unfortunately, no further 
examples are provided, nor any elaboration on the permissible incentives 
and pressures that a state may apply to secure consent, nor where the 
threshold for coercion lies in inter-state agreements.   
Since the publication of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility, it 
is clear from debates on the legality of foreign interventions that the 
existence or absence of consent is always politicized and cannot be 
removed from the geopolitical context, and the history of relations 
between the host state, and the attacking state, and their relationship with 
concerned onlookers. 
Both France and Britain used “consent to justify periodic armed 
interventions in former colonies to support friendly governments against 
small-scale rebellions or palace groups.”87 In particular, the UK used 
force in Taganyika upon the invitation of President Nyerere to quash a 
mutiny, in 1964. And although Nyerere had made the request, there was 
  
 83. Id. art. 73 cmt. n. 6 (emphasis added). 
 84. See Heyns Report, supra note 77, ¶ 108. 
 85. Id. ¶ 83. (“While there is no requirement that consent be made public, it must 
nevertheless be clear between the States concerned that consent is being given to a use of 
force, and the parameters of that consent should also be made clear. Consent must be 
given in advance. Moreover, consent must be freely given and clearly established. It must 
be actually expressed by the State rather than merely presumed on the basis that the State 
would have consented if it had been asked. Consent may be vitiated by error, fraud, 
corruption or coercion.”). 
 86. DARS, supra note 79, art. 73 n.321. 
 87. Wippman, supra note 70, at 210. 
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domestic backlash for this unpopular invitation.88 In 1979, French 
paratroopers forcibly removed Emperor of the Central African Empire, 
Jean Bedel Bokassa. Other governments protested its actions at the 
Security Council, alleging an unlawful violation of the sovereignty of the 
Central African Republic. Proponents of the intervention cited to 
Bokassa’s poor human rights record. The French incursion was deeply 
unpopular in the Central African Republic, but received little attention 
from the international community.89  
By contrast, the USSR’s invasion of Hungary in 1956, 
Czechoslovakia in 1968, and Afghanistan in 1979, each justified by 
consent were “met with widespread criticism on the ground that the 
invitations at issue were either manufactured or coerced.”90 Similarly, the 
American interventions in Dominican Republic 1965 and to Grenada in 
1983 were condemned and the legal basis for intervention, namely the 
alleged invitation, was questioned.91 None of these debates led to judicial 
determinations of coercion.  
2. Legitimacy of the Substantive Agreement and of its 
Negotiators 
In this section, I examine the way in which the law of interstate force 
grapples with questions of legitimacy. Namely, to what extent does 
popular support for the foreign intervention, and the popularity of the 
domestic government consenting to the intervention impact the latter’s 
legality.  
Conventionally, without consent to foreign intervention, neither the 
popularity of foreign intervention, nor the popularity of the leader giving 
consent carries much weight, with one important caveat.92  Debates 
  
 88. KEESING’S CONTEMPORARY ARCHIVES 19, 963 (Keesing’s Publications Ltd. 
1963-64); see also Michael Reisman, Humanitarian Intervention and Fledgling  
Democracies, 18 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 794, 796 (1994). 
 89. Wippman, supra note 70, art. 216 n.35. 
 90. Id. art. 211. 
 91. Id. 
 92. The one exception is that a state cannot authorize a foreign state to suppress a 
movement opposing racist or colonial domination, since the state would not able to do 
this itself under international law because the right to resist colonial domination is jus 
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regarding consent have thus centered on whether the government 
providing consent exercises effective territorial control over the state 
where the armed activities are set to occur, and whether this government 
is recognized as such at the international level.93 The authority to confer 
consent is based on a government’s territorial control, not their domestic 
popularity or legitimacy, which we might expect if popular sovereignty 
were firmly established as law.94  
Nonetheless, arguments have been made to shift the legal inquiry onto 
the legitimacy and popularity of the intervention and the host 
government who is party to the agreement, and to displace the 
importance paid to the acts of authorization provided by the government 
in power. These innovative arguments balance three factors when 
considering whether the extraterritorial use of force is justifiable: (1) 
whether representatives of the foreign and host state formally agreed on 
the intervention; (2) whether the foreign armed intervention is 
domestically popular—i.e., could arguably be justified as an expression 
of the people’s right to self-determination; (3) whether the government 
consent or refusal is domestically popular and/or democratic.  
  
cogens. Special Rappoeteur on the Internationally Wrongful Act of the State, Source of 
International Responsibility, Eighth Rep. on State Responsibility, Int’l Law Comm’n, ¶ 
75, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/318 and Add.1-4 (June 15, 1979) (by Roberto Ago) [hereinafter 
Eighth Rep.] (“[R]ules of jus cogens are rules whose applicability to some States cannot 
be avoided by means of special agreements. In other words, by their very nature they 
defeat any attempt to replace them by others, even in the relations between two States. 
Consequently, they can also not be affected by the special type of agreement concluded 
between the State which adopts conduct not in conformity with an obligation created by a 
peremptory rule and the State which consents to it.”); see also Wippman, supra note 70, 
at 215 (“This exception represents a specific application of the more general principle 
that a state may not lawfully authorize a foreign state to take any action that would be 
illegal under international law if undertaken by the authorizing state itself.”). Similarly, 
the content of the bilateral agreement has been regulated in one other important way, in 
that “[s]tates cannot consent to violations of international human rights law or 
international humanitarian law on their territory.” Heyns Report, supra note 77, ¶ 84. 
 93. Wippman, supra note 70, at 211-12; see also Louise Doswald- Beck, The 
Legal Validity of Military Intervention by Invitation of the Government, BRIT. Y.B. INT’L 
L. 189, 191-93 (1985). 
 94. See Emmerson Report, supra note 78, ¶ 51. 
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Ideally, these three variables are aligned, so that a government is 
actually representative, and makes a decision about permitting foreign 
intervention that reflects the wishes of the people.  But there are at least 
nine other combinations each of which raise unique questions about the 
desirability, politically and legally of such armed interventions. 
1. Intervention is unpopular + host government is unpopular + no 
consent 
2. Intervention is popular + host government is popular + no consent 
3. Intervention is popular + host government is unpopular + no 
consent 
4. Intervention is unpopular + host government is popular + no 
consent 
5. Intervention is unpopular + host government is popular + no 
consent 
6. Intervention is popular + host government is popular + consent 
7. Intervention is popular + host government is unpopular + consent 
8. Intervention is unpopular + host government is popular + consent 
9. Intervention is unpopular + host government is unpopular + consent 
An intervention under scenario six, thus would find itself on the most 
stable grounds, because it conforms to the formal consent requirement, 
while also being popular and democratic. By contrast, foreign 
interventions taking place under scenarios one through five, would be 
conventionally illegal because of the absence of consent.  But these 
interventions are not unlawful in the same or equal way.  An intervention 
that were to take place under circumstances captured by situation number 
four would be hard to justify on any grounds, because the government 
denying consent would have the mandate of its people to do so. By 
contrast, numerous arguments made to advance the legality of option 
number three—namely interventions that for example were 
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democratically supported, but opposed by the formal government, which 
was itself unpopular. In other terms, there have been arguments to justify 
ignoring consent by a host government, when the intervention would 
vindicate the wishes of the people, and unseat unpopular and 
undemocratic government. The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is one 
example of this line of justification. The NATO intervention in Libya is 
another instance in which consent was overlooked, and the intervention 
was justified based on the benefits to the people. Nonetheless, 
international tribunals have been reluctant to embrace scenario three as 
lawful grounds for intervention. In Nicaragua v. United States, the ICJ 
held that intervention is not allowed against the will of an effective 
government, even if solicited by groups within the state who characterize 
themselves as “freedom fighters.”95 Similarly, the U.S. invasion of 
Panama was condemned, in spite of the fact that “the invasion ousted a 
dictatorial regime and replaced it with a democratically elected one.”96 
The consensus remains that foreign intervention without consent cannot 
be rationalized by its results not matter how legitimate it is perceived to 
be by the citizens of a country. This is because as between sovereign 
states, there is a strong norm of non-intervention.  
In addition, the way in which the government came into power does 
not influence whether it can seek or oppose external intervention.97 And 
while arguments have been made that a military coup should also be 
deemed a violation of sovereignty, specifically a conception of popular 
just as unauthorized foreign intervention would,98 these have not become 
firmly entrenched in law. In other words, an official act of consent or 
lack of consent still rules.   
Nonetheless, in spite of prevailing legal orthodoxy, agreements have 
been challenged as non-consensual, whether because contracting 
  
 95. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. 
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 126 (June 27). 
 96. Wippman, supra note 70, at 215. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Reisman, supra note 61, at 795 (“Military coups are terrible violations of the 
political rights of all the members of the collectivity, and they invariably bring in their 
wake the violation of all the other rights. Violations of the right to popular government 
are not secondary or less important. They are very, very serious human rights 
violations.”). 
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government violated domestic law, or because it was deeply unpopular 
or because it was the puppet of a foreign government. That is to say, in 
spite of consent, interventions under scenarios seven through nine have 
been challenged as unlawful. Scenario nine is most susceptible to 
challenge because although there is formal consent, it is on unstable 
footing, relying on an unpopular agreement made with an unpopular 
government. Under scenario nine, the formal acquisition of authorization 
to use force violates popular sovereignty and the citizenry’s right to 
(internal) self-determination. These arguments were at play during the 
Third Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly and in the 
Security Council on the interventions in Lebanon and Jordan. The 
representatives of Bulgaria, Albania, and Poland “questioned the 
legitimacy of the Governments of the countries in question, which in 
their view were simply political puppets of a foreign Government, and 
maintained that in giving their consent to the entry of foreign troops 
those Governments had acted against the expressed wishes of their 
peoples.”99 Similarly, in the context of the U.S. and Belgium’s 
intervention in Congo both Ghana and Algeria both challenged the 
validity of consent because the intervention lacked popular support, and 
was secured by a local government that had been imposed by foreigners 
and rejected by the Congolese people.100 “Many States argued that the 
Tshombe government was not the ‘legal’ government of Congo, but a 
mere puppet regime imposed by force. The so-called ‘rescue operation’ 
was again considered a pretext for intervening in Congolese politics.”101 
These arguments raised by states in U.N. debates are different than 
the typical consent challenges that are concerned with whether the 
government providing consent exercised effective control at the time, or 
whether the intervention exceeded the scope of authorization.  Rather, 
  
 99. Eighth Rep., supra note 92, art. 36 n.162 (citing to arguments set forth by the 
representatives of Bulgaria, Albania, and Poland). 
 100. Id. n.163 (citing to Official Records of the Security Council, Nineteenth Year, 
1173rd meeting, ¶ 73, and 1183rd meeting, ¶ 69); See also Tom Ruys, The ‘Protecton of 
Nationals’ Doctrine Revisited, 13 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 233, 241 (2008) (“Belgium and 
the USA both justified their actions on a 2-fold basis, i.e. on the one hand, the consent of 
the legitimate Congolese authorities, and on the other hand, the responsibility to protect 
their nationals abroad.”). 
 101. Ruys, supra note 100, at 241. 
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these are challenges focus on the popular legitimacy of the government 
providing consent and the substance of the agreement. The singular 
importance conventionally paid to whether an agreement exists is 
displaced, and equal attention is paid to the context in which agreement 
was secured, and whether corroborating circumstances exist to lend to its 
legitimacy. In the absence of democratic support, the agreement is 
deemed insufficient, and consent called into question. Under this more 
demanding rubric, only an intervention under scenario six would be 
lawful.  
But, aside from arguments made by a few states in U.N. debates a 
more expansive consent inquiry that extends beyond the binary of 
whether a formal agreement exists or not has not been applied. 
Nonetheless, it creates a more ethically sound ground for consent, 
ensuring that both territorial sovereignty and popular sovereignty are 
respected. As will be made clear, the drone program in Pakistan is an 
intervention that may fall into scenario nine—i.e., while there may be 
some formal indications of authorization from the government with 
effective control over the territory, the substance of the agreement is 
deeply unpopular, making the domestic government widely mistrusted. 
The instability of scenario nine in real life challenges us to rethink the 
central role afforded to formal acts of consent in justifying interstate 
force, and invites us to think of other metrics with which to anchor our 
legal analyses of extraterritorial uses of force.  
V. THE QUESTION OF PAKISTAN’S CONSENT TO STRIKES 
While there is increasing consensus that Pakistan does not provide 
continuing consent to U.S. drone strikes,102 there a bulk of empirical 
evidence that suggests Pakistani officials facilitate or stand silent in the 
face of what otherwise would seem to be encroachments on sovereignty. 
And, documents leaked also reveal moments of explicit approval.103 
Similarly, the Obama Administration, has not disclosed any specific 
  
 102. See Emmerson Report, supra note 78, ¶ 54. 
 103. Miller & Woodward, supra note 5.
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legal guidance of the question of Pakistan’s consent to drone strikes.104 
But by allusion and indirection has stated that the U.S.’s relationship 
with Pakistan is founded on “the principles of respect for sovereignty and 
territorial integrity.”105 And, that its killing program complies with 
international law, presumably including questions of interstate force.106 
To help make sense of these conflicting signals, I turn to the broader 
historical, political and geopolitical context. Upon deeper examination, it 
becomes clear that an affirmative finding of consent erases the instability 
of the bilateral arrangement, the strong popular opposition to the U.S. 
bombing campaign, and the opaque relationship it sets up between 
citizens and their state. The extreme case of Pakistan puts into relief how 
unsatisfactory it can be to resort to formal acts of consent between 
governments, regardless of their popularity and perceived legitimacy.   
  
 104. In fact, there are persisting questions about the Obama legal justifications for 
its drone program, whether in Pakistan, Yemen or elsewhere, including questions of 
interstate force and the sovereignty of states hosting the groups targeted. The New York 
Times and the American Civil Liberties Union sought to compel the CIA to disclose an 
opinion by the Office of Legal Council, which provides a legal justification for the 
Obama administration’s targeted killing program. The Second Circuit ruled that the legal 
opinion must be disclosed. See New York Times Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 915 F. 
Supp. 2d 508, 515 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (granting the government’s motion for summary 
judgment, holding that the opinion may be lawfully withheld from plaintiff’s under the 
National Security Act, 50 U.S.C. § 403–1(i)(1)) rev’d, 752 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 2014) 
(ruling that the government waived the secrecy and privilege of the legal analysis 
contained in the Office of Legal Counsel’s memorandum and that the portions of 
explaining legal reasoning were not protected from release pursuant to FOIA exemption 
for records specifically authorized under criteria established by Executive order to be 
kept secret). 
 105. Obama, Sharif Discuss Security Cooperation, Drones, supra note 3. 
 106. Barack Obama, President, Remarks by the President at the National Defense 
University (May 23, 2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2013/05/23/remarks-president-national-defense-university (“Moreover, America’s 
actions are legal. We were attacked on 9/11. Within a week, Congress overwhelmingly 
authorized the use of force. Under domestic law, and international law, the United States 
is at war with al Qaeda, the Taliban, and their associated forces. We are at war with an 
organization that right now would kill as many Americans as they could if we did not 
stop them first. So this is a just war—war waged proportionally, in last resort, and in self-
defense.”). 
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A. Pakistan’s Ambiguous Consent  
In what follows, I discuss the core, publicly available factual 
propositions that are dispositive for a finding of consent and elaborate on 
their implications in turn. Because of the secrecy of the program, and the 
mendacity that has characterized officials “disclosures,” I rely on 
journalistic accounts to provide details of the drone program.  
1. At Some Point, Pakistan Explicitly Authorized These 
Strikes...  
Since the first strike in 2004, drone strikes have taken place over the 
course of a military dictatorship and two civil administrations, which 
have governed Pakistan for the past ten years. Strikes were first launched 
when former military dictator President Pervez Musharraf’s was in 
power. Since stepping down, Musharraf has admitted to providing 
authorizing for a few strikes. But, he stopped short of affirming the 
corollary—that the remaining strikes under his watched lacked 
authorization.107  
Pulitzer prize winning journalist Mark Mazetti, who has spent his 
career covering Pakistan, and the country’s relations with the U.S. has 
uncovered details about the first CIA strike in Pakistan in 2004.  
According to his reporting, the first drone strike’s target was Nek 
Muhammad, who was not a member of Al Qaeda, but an ally of the 
Afghan Taliban, and who had allegedly orchestrated attacks against 
Pakistan. “In a secret deal, the C.I.A. had agreed to kill him in exchange 
for access to airspace it had long sought so it could use drones to hunt 
down its own enemies.”108 Under this initial 2004 agreement, between 
  
 107. Nic Robertson & Greg Botelho, Ex-Pakistani President Musharraf admits 
secret deal with U.S. on drone strikes, CNN,  
http://edition.cnn.com/2013/04/11/world/asia/pakistan-musharraf-drones/index.html (last 
updated Apr. 12, 2013) (Interviewer: “You are saying that on occasion there was 
agreement [to drone strikes].” Pervez Musharraf: “[O]nly on very few occasions, where 
the target was absolutely isolated and there was no chance of collateral damage.”). 
 108. Mark Mazzetti, A Secret Deal on Drones, Sealed in Blood, N.Y. TIMES, (Apr. 
6, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/07/world/asia/origins-of-cias-not-so-secret-
drone-war-in-pakistan.html?pagewanted=2&ref=markmazzetti&pagewanted=all. 
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the CIA and Pakistan’s intelligence Agency, the ISI, Pakistani officials 
were said to have been given the opportunity to approve targets. Strikes 
were to be confined to the tribal regions.109 In addition, Mazetti states 
that the US “would never acknowledge the missile strikes and that 
Pakistan would either take credit for the individual killings or remain 
silent.” 110  
Mazetti’s reporting and Musharraf’s admission are corroborated by 
Special Rapporteur Ben Emmerson’s investigation into the same issue. 
He concluded that between June 2004 and June 2008: 
there is strong evidence to suggest that . . . remotely piloted aircraft 
strikes in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas were conducted with 
the active consent and approval of senior members of the Pakistani 
military and intelligence service, and with at least the acquiescence 
and, in some instances, the active approval of senior government 
figures.111 
But, the evidence that the heads of state in more recent years have 
actively participated in the drone program is less compelling, a point 
which that I will return to shortly. 
2. At Another Point, Pakistan Opposed the Strikes in Public, 
but Not in Private...  
From 2004-2008, the existence of covert U.S. drone strikes in 
Pakistan remained largely unknown. By 2009, the acceleration of these 
strikes drew greater scrutiny from the media and the Pakistani and 
American publics. Once the issue entered public debate, the Pakistani 
government, which after Musharraf was a civilian administration lead by 
Yousuf Raza Gilani, protested the strikes. However, an American 
Senator in response stated that the US relied on access to Pakistan 
airbases in order to conduct strikes.112  
  
 109. See id. 
 110. Id.  
 111. Emmerson Report, supra note 78, ¶ 53. 
 112. Pakistani Bases Not Being Used for Drone Attacks: FM, DAILY TIMES, (Feb. 
16, 2009), http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2009\02\16\story_16-2-
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A diplomatic cable from August 28th 2008 recorded by then U.S. 
Ambassador Anne Patterson reveals that at that point, the Pakistan 
government could not in public admit it authorized the strikes. In the 
cable, then Interior Minister Rehman suggests that Predator drone attacks 
be postponed until after the Pakistan military’s own offensive in Bajaur, 
FATA. In response, however, then Prime Minister, Yousuf Raza Gilani 
apparently brushed off the suggestion, and said, “I don’t care if they do it 
as long as they get the right people. We’ll protest in the National 
Assembly and then ignore it.”113  
  
2009_pg7_4 (“[Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood] Qureshi told journalists before flying 
to the federal capital that US drone attacks were affecting Pakistan’s sovereignty, and 
clarified that the drones were not being flown from bases inside Pakistan. He said 
Pakistan had always condemned the drone attacks over which no understanding or 
agreement existed.”). Pakistan for Review of US Drone Attacks, THE NATION (Feb. 27, 
2009),  
http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/Politics/27-
Feb-2009/Pakistan-for-review-of-US-drone-attacks (quoting Shah Mahmood Qureshi, 
“What I’m asking for is that they have to review the strategy vis-a-vis drones . . . The US 
missile strikes… are counterproductive and have fanned an Islamist insurgency across 
northwest Pakistan . . . . If they are a necessity, then we are suggesting that the 
technology be transferred to Pakistan and that will resolve quite a few issues with the 
people of Pakistan.”). See also Issam Ahmed, Oops! Pakistan Condemns US’s Drone 
Attacks (But Also Hosts Them), CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Feb.18, 2009), 
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Global-News/2009/0218/oops-pakistan-condemns-uss-
drone-attacks-but-also-hosts-them; see also Declan Walsh, WikiLeaks Cables: US Special 
Forces Working Inside Pakistan, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 30, 2010), available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/nov/30/wikileaks-cables-us-forces-embedded-
pakistan; See also Mark Mazzetti and Souad Mekhennet, Qaeda Planner in Pakistan 
Killed by Drone, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 11 2009),  
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/12/world/asia/12drone.html?_r=0.
 113. US Embassy Cables: Pakistan Backs US Drone Attacks on Tribal Areas, THE 
GUARDIAN (Nov. 30 2010), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-
documents/167125 (diplomatic cable from U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan Anne Patterson, 
dated August 23, 2008). See also US embassy cables: XXXXXXXXXXXX PROVIDES 
GRIM ASSESSMENT OF SITUATION IN THE NWFP AND FATA, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 
30, 2010),  
http://www.theguardian.com/world/us-embassy-cables-
documents/185598?guni=Article:in%20body%20link (“XXXXXXXXXXXX said he 
wanted to say in an unofficial capacity that he and many others could accept Predator 
strikes as they were surgical and clearly hitting high value targets. He mentioned that fear 
among the local populace in areas where the strikes have been occurring was lessening 
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More recently, in 2013, then current Pakistani ambassador to the US, 
Sherry Rehman tried to dispel rumors of the existence of a secret 
agreement between the two countries: “There is no policy of quiet 
complacency, no wink and nod.”114 It is unclear whether Rehman’s 
refutation applies to only the Gilani administration’s position, and when 
this position was adopted. More cynically, her statement could also be 
consistent with Pakistan’s policy of saying one in thing in public and one 
in private.  
Yet, putting aside Rehman’s refutation, even Pakistan’s policy double 
speak—authorizing in private yet protesting in public, itself weakens the 
case for consent. Pakistan’s ambiguity in its position is widely viewed as 
strategic. The Pakistan government is compelled to double-speak 
because of the widespread public condemnation of drone strikes by the 
Pakistani public,115 and by elected leaders. It has not been politically 
  
because ‘everyone knew that they only hit the house or location of very bad people.’ He 
wondered why the strikes did not seem to target more of the [T]aliban which he reasoned 
was needed. He said ‘our house is on fire and we need to take drastic actions.’”).
 114. Pakistani Ambassador Opposes Drone Strikes, UPI (Feb. 6, 2013), 
http://www.upi.com/Top_News/US/2013/02/06/Pakistani-ambassador-opposes-drone-
strikes/UPI-65341360132626/#ixzz2hA50TO8i. 
 115. According to a survey conducted by the New America Foundation, in the 
Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), “[n]early nine out every ten people . . . 
oppose the U.S. military pursuing al-Qaeda and the Taliban in their region. Nearly 70 
percent of FATA residents instead want the Pakistani military alone to fight Taliban and 
al-Qaeda militants in the tribal . . . . More than three-quarters of FATA residents oppose 
American drone strikes.” New America Foundation and Terror Free Tomorrow, Public 
Opinion in Pakistan’s Tribal Regions 1-3 (2010), available at  
http://www.newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/FATApoll.pdf. 
Similarly, only “17% of Pakistanis support the U.S. conducting drone strikes in 
conjunction with the Pakistani government against leaders of extremist organizations.” 
Little Support in Pakistan for American Drone Strikes Targeting Extremist Leaders, PEW 
RESEARCH CENTER (June 29 2012),  
http://www.pewresearch.org/daily-number/little-support-in-pakistan-for-american-drone-
strikes-targeting-extremist-leaders. But see C. Christine Fair et al., You Say Pakistanis All 
Hate the Drone War? Prove It, ATLANTIC (Jan. 23 2013),  
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/01/you-say-pakistanis-all-hate-
the-drone-war-prove-it/267447 (challenging the conclusions of the Pew Research Center 
mentioned above, stating “Pakistanis are not united in opposition to drone strikes. In fact, 
many Pakistanis support the drone strikes. . . . There is not a wall of opposition to drone 
strikes in Pakistan but a vocal plurality that merely gives that impression.”). 
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possible for the Pakistani officials to admit to providing consent to the 
strikes. There are significant indicia of public opposition to drone 
strikes.116 And, there are recurring protests against these strikes. Given 
the public’s discourse around strikes in Pakistan, it is not tenable for 
Pakistan’s leaders to publicly support the US’s bombing campaign. 
While secrecy may be a common characteristic to bilateral agreements 
regarding to the use force, in Pakistan, the agreement, if one exists, is 
veiled in opacity because the Pakistani public views it as illegitimate. 
Pakistan’s compulsion to be strategically ambiguous about the extent of 
its involvement in the drone program raises questions about the unsettled 
role of legitimacy in the consent doctrine. If and how should the law 
consider bilateral agreements governing the use of force which are 
profoundly unpopular? Is democratic legitimacy a value that the consent 
doctrine ought to embrace?  
3. More Recently, Pakistan’s Role in the Drone Program 
Has Been Less Direct... 
According to Mazetti, by July 2008, Pakistan would no longer receive 
advance warning from the US before strikes in the tribal regions.117 
  
 116. See supra note Error! Bookmark not defined..  
In addition, to the polls previously mentioned, the editorial pages of Urdu 
language newspapers similarly reflect resounding opposition to the 
strikes. For example, an editorial published by Mashriq argues, Pakistan 
is facing intractable problems because of the drone attacks. On the one 
hand, precious lives are lost, and on the other, the stability of the country 
is endangered. In fact, the federal government has repeatedly asked the 
United States to stop the drone attacks, but it appears that the US 
Administration has no realization, whatsoever, about the problems and 
hardships of its ally and is bent on going ahead with its policies at all 
costs. 
See Juan Cole, Urdu Editorials Condemn US Predator Strikes on Pakistan, INFORMED 
COMMENT (Mar. 28, 2009), http://www.juancole.com/2009/03/urdu-editorials-condemn-
us-predator.html (excerpting translations of editorials published by Pakistani Urdu 
newspapers condemning U.S. drone strikes).
 117. Mark Mazzetti, How a Single Spy Helped Turn Pakistan Against the United 
States, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 9, 2013),  
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“From that point on, the C.I.A. officers told Kayani, [Pakistani Army 
chief] the C.I.A.’s killing campaign in Pakistan would be a unilateral 
war.”118 An article by Wall Street Journal corroborates Mazetti’s 
timeline, and reports that since 2011, Pakistan’s ISI receives a monthly 
fax from the U.S., which notifies the ISI Pakistan of the broad areas 
where the U.S. intends to conduct strikes, but without any mention of 
any specific targets.119 The ISI does not respond to the substance of the 
message providing only confirmation of receipt, together this act and 
omission is construed as consent by the U.S. government.120  
Similarly, the Abbottabad Commission Report, which published the 
findings of the investigation to explain how Osama Bin Laden was able 
to live undisturbed in Abbottabad, corroborates this same evolution of 
diplomatic relations: 
Regarding any understanding between the US and Pakistan on the 
American drone attacks, the DG said there were no written agreements. 
  
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/14/magazine/raymond-davis-
pakistan.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. See also Adam Entous et al., U.S. Unease Over 
Drone Strikes, WALL ST., J. (Sept. 26, 2012),  
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10000872396390444100404577641520858011452 
(“In the early days of the Afghan war, lists of specific individuals to be targeted on 
Pakistani soil by U.S. drones were approved by both the U.S. and Pakistan, in what was 
called a “dual-key” system. Starting about four years ago, the U.S. began increasingly to 
go it alone.”). 
 118. See id. 
 119. See also Entous et al., supra note 117 (“About once a month, the Central 
Intelligence Agency sends a fax to a general at Pakistan’s intelligence service outlining 
broad areas where the U.S. intends to conduct strikes with drone aircraft, according to 
U.S. officials. The Pakistanis, who in public oppose the program, don’t respond. On this 
basis, plus the fact that Pakistan continues to clear airspace in the targeted areas, the U.S. 
government concludes it has tacit consent to conduct strikes within the borders of a 
sovereign nation, according to officials familiar with the program.”). 
 120. Id. (“The Pakistanis, who in public oppose the program, don’t respond. On 
this basis, plus the fact that Pakistan continues to clear airspace in the targeted areas, the 
U.S. government concludes it has tacit consent to conduct strikes within the borders of a 
sovereign nation, according to officials familiar with the program. . . .The ISI would send 
back a fax acknowledging receipt. The return messages stopped short of endorsing drone 
strikes. But in U.S. eyes the fax response combined with the continued clearing of 
airspace to avoid midair collisions—a process known as ‘de-confliction’—represented 
Pakistan’s tacit consent to the program.”). 
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There was a political understanding. The Americans had been asked to 
stop such attacks on a number of occasions as they resulted in civilian 
casualties. However, it was easier to say no to them in the beginning, 
but ‘now it was more difficult’ to do so. Admittedly the drone attacks 
had their utility, but they represented a breach of national sovereignty. 
There were ‘legal according to American law but illegal according to 
international law.’121 
The change in the terms of the engagement, from explicit involvement 
to non-interference, coincided with a transition from a military to a 
civilian government. Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani took power in 
March 2008, after the first election since Musharraf’s resignation. 2008 
is also when President Obama came into office. The Obama 
administration is responsible for the majority of the drone strikes in 
Pakistan. Thus, piecing together the elements from Mazetti and 
Emmerson’s chronology, the bulk of strikes seem to have been 
conducted unilaterally, without direct involvement by Pakistan’s civilian 
government. The Wikileaks cable and the Abbottabad Commission 
Report suggest that while there may have been no direct involvement, the 
government has at some points maintained a policy of non-interference.  
The reasons for non-interference are not clear, and may have varied 
over the years: tacit support, indifference or a practical inability to stop. 
The first two grounds for non-interference would be deeply unpopular in 
Pakistani political landscape, and so each is consistent with a policy of 
double speak, which as noted in the previous section raises questions 
about the value of legitimacy in bilateral force agreements. But non-
interference because of inability raises other legal questions, discussed in 
the next paragraphs. 
  
 121. Abbottabad Commission Report § 477, available at  
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/spotlight/binladenfiles/2013/07/201378143927822246.
html. 
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4. Drone Strikes Have Been Temporarily Suspended in 
Response to Diplomatic Crises...  
The media is frequently abuzz with the tense nature of U.S.-Pakistan 
relations.122 And, drone strikes are the central point of contention 
between the U.S. and Pakistan. In spite of Pakistan’s practice of non-
interference, in that Pakistan’s armed forces do not shoot down drones, 
for example, Pakistan government’s rhetoric has been consistently and 
clearly in opposition to strikes.123 With the transition to a civilian 
government, and the escalation of strikes under Obama, the executive 
branch has been forced to develop a palatable public position on the 
strikes that reflects the views of its constituents and peers, even though it 
may be at odds with its own actions, though it not clear whether this is 
duplicity persists. 
Since February 2009, there have been at least nineteen instances in 
which the Foreign Ministry has condemned drone strikes, and U.S. 
diplomats summoned to lodge formal complains.124  The grievances 
  
 122. See generally Pakistan-United States relations, WIKIPEDIA,  
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pakistan%E2%80%93United_States_relations (last visited 
Feb. 20, 2015). 
 123. See, e.g., Ben Farley, Drones and Pakistan, Consent and Sovereignty, D.C. 
EXILE (Mar. 16, 2013),  
http://dcexile.blogspot.com/2013/03/drones-and-pakistan-consent-and.html (“Not only 
has Pakistan not taken such steps in response to U.S. drone strikes, at least until the Wall 
Street Journal report at the end of September 2012, Pakistan continued to clear the parts 
of its air space in which the CIA indicated it would conduct drone strikes.  That is to say, 
not only is Pakistan not intervening to prevent drone strikes, it is taking affirmative steps 
to facilitate those strikes. Thus, Pakistan’s behavior at least renders its public statement 
ambiguous and, more likely, supersedes those statements altogether. Again, consent must 
be clearly stated but clearly stated to the recipient of that consent not the outside world.”). 
 124. See, e.g., Press Release, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Gov’t of Pak., Pak. 
Condemns the U.S. Drone Strike in Mir Ali Area (Apr. 29, 2012), http://mofa.gov.pk/pr-
details.php?prID=198; Press Release, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Gov’t of Pak., Pak. 
Condemns Drone Attack (May 5, 2012), http://mofa.gov.pk/pr-details.php?prID=201; 
Press Release, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Gov’t of Pak., Drone Attacks in N. Waziristan 
(Aug. 18, 2012), http://mofa.gov.pk/pr-details.php?prID=277; Press Release, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs Gov’t of Pak., U.S. Embassy Conveyed Protests Against Drone Strikes 
(Aug. 23, 2012) http://mofa.gov.pk/pr-details.php?prID=278; Press Release, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs Gov’t of Pak., Spokesperson’s Response to U.S. Newspaper Report on 
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Drone Attacks, (Sept. 28, 2012) http://mofa.gov.pk/pr-details.php?prID=330; Press 
Release, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Gov’t of Pak., Protest Lodged with U.S. Embassy 
Against Drone Strikes, (Oct. 11, 2012), http://mofa.gov.pk/pr-details.php?prID=341; 
Press Release, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Gov’t of Pak., Pak. Condemns the U.S. Drone 
Strike in Mir Ali Area, (Aug. 31, 2013), http://mofa.gov.pk/pr-details.php?prID=1395; 
Press Release, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Gov’t of Pak., Pak. Condemns U.S. Drone 
Strike, (Sept. 6, 2013), http://mofa.gov.pk/pr-details.php?prID=1415; Press Release, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Gov’t of Pak., Pak. Condemns the U.S. Drone Strike in S. 
Waziristan, (Sept. 22, 2013), http://mofa.gov.pk/pr-details.php?prID=1442; Press 
Release, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Gov’t of Pak., Pak. Condemns the U.S. Drone Strike 
Near Miranshah, (Sept. 29, 2013), http://mofa.gov.pk/pr-details.php?prID=1483; Press 
Release, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Gov’t of Pak., Pak. Condemns the U.S .Drone Strike 
in N. Waziristan, (Sept. 30, 2013), http://mofa.gov.pk/pr-details.php?prID=1484; Press 
Release, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Gov’t of Pak., Pak. Condemns the U.S. Drone Strike 
in Miranshah, (Oct. 31, 2013), http://mofa.gov.pk/pr-details.php?prID=1513; Press 
Release, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Gov’t of Pak., Pak. Condemns the U.S. drone strike 
in N. Waziristan, (Nov. 1, 2013), http://mofa.gov.pk/pr-details.php?prID=1517; Press 
Release, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Gov’t of Pak., Pak. Condemns the U.S. Drone Strike 
in Hangu, (Nov. 11, 2013), http://mofa.gov.pk/pr-details.php?prID=1565; Press Release, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Gov’t of Pak., Pak. Condemns the U.S. Drone Strike in 
Miranshah, (Dec. 26, 2013), http://mofa.gov.pk/pr-details.php?prID=1631; Press Release, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Gov’t of Pak., Pak. Condemns U.S. Drone Strike in 
Miranshah, (June 12, 2014), http://www.mofa.gov.pk/pr-details.php?prID=2034; Press 
Release, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Gov’t of Pak., Pak. Condemns U.S. Drone Strike in 
Miranshah, (June 18, 2014), http://www.mofa.gov.pk/pr-details.php?prID=2046; Press 
Release, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Gov’t of Pak., Pak. Condemns U.S. Drone Strike in 
N. Waziristan, (July 11 2014), http://www.mofa.gov.pk/pr-details.php?prID=2090; Press 
Release, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Gov’t of Pak., Pak. Condemns U.S. Drone Strike in 
N. Waziristan, (July 19, 2014), http://www.mofa.gov.pk/pr-details.php?prID=2097. See 
also Pakistan Summons US Ambassador to Protest Against Latest Drone Killings, 
GUARDIAN (June 8, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/08/pakistan-us-
drone-killings (“The prime minister of Pakistan has summoned the US ambassador in 
anger after an American drone attack killed nine people in North Waziristan.”).  After 
Hakimullah Mehsud’s death, the leader of the Pakistan Taliban, another formal complaint 
was lodged and US diplomats were summoned. Jalil Abbas Jilani, then Foreign Secretary 
stated, “[w]e consider drones as illegal, non-productive and accordingly unacceptable.” 
See also Kamran Yousaf, Pakistan Lodges Formal Complaint over N Waziristan Drone 
Attack, EXPRESS TRIB. (Apr. 30, 2012), available at  
http://tribune.com.pk/story/372224/pakistan-lodges-formal- complaint-over-n-waziristan-
drone-attack (“The Predator attack was the first since the Parliament approved new terms 
of engagements that seek an immediate halt in the CIA-piloted campaign. During recent 
high-level talks, Pakistan had categorically told the US that drones are totally 
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lodged mirror those submitted when NATO forces in Afghanistan have 
encroached on Pakistan’s sovereignty.125 In addition, senior officials 
have spoken against the strikes, such as Sherry Rehman, former 
ambassador to the U.S.126  
In the spring of 2013, Nawaz Sharif’s party, the PML-N won the 
election, became prime minister. Within his first months in office, he 
issued a public statement against the drone strikes, after the second strike 
since his election killed at least 7 and up to 9 people.127 In November 
2013, after a drone strike was alleged to have killed leader of the Tehrik-
e-Taliban Pakistan, Hakimullah Mehsud, Sharif’s Interior Minister 
Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan criticized the US’s actions for derailing 
pending talks with the Pakistan’s main militant group.128  In response to 
the same strike, PTI, the ruling party of Pakistan’s northwestern 
province, Khyber-Pakhtunwa, which is adjacent to FATA, threatened 
cutting off access routes for NATO supply trucks if strikes were not 
halted.129 
  
unacceptable.”); Declan Walsh & Ismail Khan, Pakistani Party Votes to Block NATO 
Supply Lines if Drones Persist, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4 2013),  
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/05/world/asia/pakistani-party-votes-to-block-nato-
supply-lines-if-drone-strikes-persist.html?_r=0. 
 125. See, e.g., Islamabad Urges Kabul to Stop Border Incursions, EXPRESS TRIB. 
(June 27, 2012),  
http://tribune.com.pk/story/399762/islamabad-urges-kabul-to-stop-border-incursions. 
 126. See supra note 114. 
 127. See Pakistan Summons US Ambassador to Protest Against Latest Drone 
Killings, THE GUARDIAN (June 8, 2013),  
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/08/pakistan-us-drone-killings (“The prime 
minister of Pakistan has summoned the US ambassador in anger after an American drone 
attack killed nine people in North Waziristan.”); Pakistan drone strike kills seven in 
North Waziristan, BBC NEWS (June 8, 2013),  
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-22820208. 
 128. See Hakimullah Mehsud Drone Strike: ‘Death of Peace Efforts’, BBC NEWS 
(Nov. 2, 2013), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-24787637.
 129. Declan Walsh & Ismail Khan, supra note 124, at A7 (“The ruling party in a 
northwestern province of Pakistan voted Monday to block NATO supply lines by Nov. 
20 unless the United States stops its drone strikes in the nearby tribal belt.”). 
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And in some instances, in response to political crisis, strikes seem to 
have been suspended.130 Two of the longest pauses to an otherwise 
regular pattern of drone strikes in the tribal belt occurred when relations 
between countries were at their weakest: first, when Raymond Davis, a 
U.S. government employee, working for the CIA, whose activities were 
undisclosed to the Pakistan government, shot two people in Lahore,131 
and second when Pakistani soldiers were killed by NATO soldiers in 
Afghanistan.132  
  
 130. There was a twenty-day break from drone strikes when floods hit Pakistan in 
August of 2010, but the longest have been in response to political crises. Furthermore, the 
stay in strikes did not last into the recovery and reconstruction of the floods, which left 
affected 20 million people, covering one fifth of the country’s landmass. See Chris 
Woods, Secret CIA Drone Attacks in Pakistan Suspended, as Obama Seeks to Free 
Imprisoned ‘Diplomat’, THE BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM (Feb. 18, 2011), 
http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/blog/2011/02/18/secret-cia-drone-attacks-in-
pakistan-suspended-as-obama-seeks-to-free-imprisoned-diplomat (reporting on the 
frequency of U.S. drone strikes in Pakistan, noting that “[e]ven during Pakistan’s flood 
crisis of summer 2010, the campaign was suspended for just 20 days.”). 
 131. From January 23 to February 14, 2011, not a single drone strike was reported 
in Pakistan, which is in contrast to an otherwise steady pattern of a strike every four days, 
which has abated in late 2013 and 2014. See id. (“One hundred and eighty lethal US 
drone strikes have been made inside Pakistan since Barack Obama became president: a 
deadly attack every four days or so….Yet no drone attack has been reported in Pakistan 
since January 23rd. Not since June 2009 has the drones campaign seen such a long 
pause–26 days having passed.”).
 132. This political crisis lead to a six-week reprieve from strikes. See U.S. Drone 
Strike in Pakistan Ends Six-Week Pause; 4 Dead, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 11 2012), 
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/world_now/2012/01/drone-strike-in-pakistan-ends-six-
week-pause.html#sthash.0EDSPk3C.dpuf (“[T]he U.S. air strikes[, which] mistakenly 
killed two dozen Pakistani soldiers along the Afghan border Nov. 26 incensed the 
Pakistani military and government, which viewed the attack as deliberate and 
unprovoked. In retaliation for the airstrikes, Islamabad shut down the use of Pakistan as a 
transit country for NATO shipments bound for Western forces in Afghanistan. The U.S. 
was forced to vacate an air base in southern Pakistan that the CIA had used to launch 
drone flights into Pakistan’s volatile tribal areas, though Washington still can carry out 
drone flights from bases in Afghanistan…. Since the Nov. 26 incident, drone strikes in 
Pakistan have stopped. Current and former U.S. officials recently told The Times that the 
CIA had suspended drone missile strikes on gatherings of low-ranking militants 
suspected in attacks on U.S. troops in Afghanistan. The move, they said, was an attempt 
to patch up steadily eroding ties between the two countries.”). 
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More recently, from December 25 to June 11, there was a pause in 
drone strikes, which is to date the longest.133 Reports suggest this pause 
was due to a Pakistan government request to suspend strikes during the 
pendency of talks with the Taliban, which had been in part frustrated by 
continued U.S. bombing.134 The first strike in six months on June 12 
preceded by three days the Pakistan military’s own offensive in the tribal 
areas following an attack by the TTP on the Karachi Airport. Yet, despite 
what might appear as bilateral military coordination, the Foreign 
Ministry issued a condemnation of the June 12 strikes, and subsequent 
strikes.135 
While the sample size is small, some inferences can be drawn, even if 
tentative. The suspension of strikes in response to political crisis 
complicates the narrative that Pakistan unambiguously endorses these 
strikes in private. The pause in strikes is a reflection of the US’s 
recognition that Pakistan is not supportive of the U.S.’s bombing 
campaign, and its continuance comes at high political cost. Seemingly, 
any other dispute, on top of the drone issue can tip an already precarious 
balance between the two countries. The strikes in the summer of 2014, 
which appear to be in coordination with the Pakistani military highlight 
  
 133. Charlie Mole, Pakistan Military Air Strikes Kill hundreds, Including 
Civilians, Over Past Six Months, THE BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM (June 23, 
2014),  
http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2014/06/23/pakistan-military-air-strikes-kill-
hundreds-including-civilians-over-past-six-months.
 134. See Karen DeYoung & Greg Miller, U.S. Curtails Drone Strikes in Pakistan 
as Officials There Seek Peace Talks with Taliban, WASH. POST (Feb. 4, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-curtails-drone-strikes-in-
pakistan-as-officials-there-seek-peace-talks-with-taliban/2014/02/04/1d63f52a-8dd8-
11e3-833c-33098f9e5267_story.html.
 135. See, e.g.,  Press Release, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Gov’t of Pak., Pak. 
Condemns U.S. Drone Strike in Miranshah, (June 12, 2014), http://www.mofa.gov.pk/pr-
details.php?prID=2034; Press Release, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Gov’t of Pak., Pak. 
Condemns U.S. Drone Strike in Miranshah, (June 18, 2014), http://www.mofa.gov.pk/pr-
details.php?prID=2046; Press Release, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Gov’t of Pak., Pak. 
Condemns U.S. Drone Strike in N. Waziristan, (July 11 2014),  
http://www.mofa.gov.pk/pr-details.php?prID=2090; Press Release, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs Gov’t of Pak., Pak. Condemns U.S. Drone Strike in N. Waziristan, (July 19, 
2014), http://www.mofa.gov.pk/pr-details.php?prID=2097. 
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how the existence of consent is based on a political climate that is ever 
shifting, depending on the military establishment’s tenuous relationship 
with the militant groups in the northwest. Such fragility illustrates that 
contractual agreements, whether between states and parties are not 
singular instances, but are continually negotiated, and affirmed. Given 
the fragility of U.S.—Pakistan relationship, at which drones are the 
center, should we infer consent in the face of such instability? Should 
stability be required for continuing consent to the use of interstate force?  
The obvious question from these facts is why the Pakistani 
government does not put an end to these strikes, given the high political 
cost of the continuing strikes and its fraught relationship with the U.S. 
And how should the law interpret its non-interference? Pakistan’s policy 
of non-interference in spite of its rhetorical opposition can be explained 
by the different bargaining positions between it and the U.S. and the 
historical terms of these countries relationship.  
Historically, Pakistan has fashioned itself into a client state to the 
U.S., which has created a political dependence in Pakistan government. 
The close government and military relationship has been cause for 
regular frictions and breakdowns. But, the U.S. has maintained the upper 
hand, determining the terms of the relationship. The Pakistan 
government has relied on whatever U.S. support provided as an essential 
crutch for geopolitical strength. In addition, in recent decades the country 
has developed a dependence on foreign aid in particular on IMF loans,136 
and U.S. aid, as the largest donor.137 
  
 136. In 2009, Pakistan received US$ 3,297 million in foreign aid.  Approximately 
60% of this aid is used to service debts. See Muhammad Javid & Abdul Qayyum, 
Foreign Aid and Growth Nexus in Pakistan: The Role of Macroeconomic Policies, 72 
PIDE WORKING PAPERS 1, 7 (2011), available at  
http://www.pide.org.pk/pdf/Working%20Paper/WorkingPaper-72.pdf.  
(“Due to enormously large accumulated foreign debt, most of the aid is being used for 
debt servicing…. Each successive government in Pakistan relied on foreign aid to finance 
a significant proportion of investment and import requirement for self-sustaining 
economic growth….Significance increase in aid inflow took place during sixties although 
after the 1965 war with India slowed down.”) Id. at 6. 
 137. Javid & Qayyum, supra note 136, at 6: 
Aid inflow to Pakistan has a strong association with geo-political interest 
of donors. The increases in aid inflow in decade of 1960s in connect with 
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In line with a carrot and stick approach to diplomacy, Pakistan’s 
involvement in the War on Terror was secured by threat and gifts. Pervez 
Musharraf reported that he was given two options after 9/11 by Richard 
Armitage, then deputy Secretary of State: Pakistan could cooperate with 
the U.S. or else risk “being bombed back to the Stone Age.”138 Although, 
Armitage has disputed those words, he has not denied sending a strong 
message to Pakistan.139 In return, for cooperation, Pakistan would be 
rewarded for its cooperation in the form of aid, after years of sanctions 
for its nuclear program.140 
During Nawaz Sharif’s November 2013 visit to the U.S., Pakistan’s 
dependency on aid was in clear tension with its other goals as a 
sovereign state. While protesting drone strikes, Sharif also accepted a 
disbursement of $1.6 billion in security assistance, that had been frozen 
as a result setbacks in bilateral relations, including the Raymond Davis 
affair, the raid on Osama bin Laden’s compound in Pakistan, and the 
  
Pakistan’s signing of mutual defense assistance agreements with United 
State in cold war era. Aid inflow of 1980s can be visualized in 
perspective of Afghanistan war. In 1990s economic assistance to Pakistan 
was cut off by USA and other multilateral donor’s when Afghan war 
ended. Aid inflow to Pakistan was further dropped down after nuclear test 
in 1998 and military takeover in 1999. Most recent aid inflow is a result 
of Pak-US closer ties after 9/11. 
 138. U.S. ‘Threatened to Bomb’ Pakistan, BBC NEWS (Sept. 22, 2006),  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/5369198.stm. 
 139. See Pakistan’s Musharraf: U.S. Official Promised Bombing Country Back to 
‘Stone Age’, FOX NEWS (Sept. 21, 2006),  
http://www.foxnews.com/story/2006/09/21/pakistan-musharraf-us-official-promised-
bombing-country-back-to-stone-age.
 140. John King & Andrea Koppel, Bush Administration Puts Pressure on 
Pakistan, CNN (Sept. 13, 2001),  
http://edition.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/central/09/13/pakistan.us.bush  
(“The United States has little leverage to use against Pakistan, with a host of sanctions 
already in place against the country. But Powell indicated that the United States could 
help Pakistan if the government is willing to cooperate. ‘They’re sanctioned up to the 
eyeballs and they don’t have that much aid now,’ Powell said. ‘But I think we have been 
exploring with the Pakistani government many ways that we can move forward in the 
relationship and we want to do so.’”). See also Christophe Jaffrelot, La relation Pakistan 
– Etats-Unis: Un Patron et Son Client au Bord de la Rupture?, 187 LES ETUDES DU CERI 
9 (2012), available at  
http://www.sciencespo.fr/ceri/sites/sciencespo.fr.ceri/files/Etude%20187.pdf. 
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death of Pakistani border guards killed by NATO forces.141 Pakistan is 
not unique in its aid foreign aid dependence and its clientism, which in 
turn makes it vulnerable to certain concessions that favor the donor’s 
interests.142 
The question therefore is whether it is realistic to assume that poorer 
client states can meaningfully negotiate agreements with the U.S.? It is 
of course logically possible for Pakistan to end or modify the current 
terms of the bilateral relationship. And there are notable instances when 
Pakistan has acted in ways that complicate a simplistic client state 
theory.143 It is not inevitable that Pakistan consistently follow US foreign 
policy prerogatives. But at this moment, the private acquiescence that 
may exist should be viewed in the context of a long history of 
collaboration and patron-client relationships.144 And what this history 
suggests is that the choice of shooting down the drones, which would be 
the clearest manifestation that the strikes are non-consensual would 
entail such a clear break from history and the legacy of collaboration, 
that it is unlikely. As scholars of the Pakistan’s political economy have 
noted, the collaboration with the US, largely through the armed forces 
  
 141. Warren Strobel, As Ties Warm, U.S. Restarts Security Assistance to Pakistan, 
REUTERS (Oct. 20, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/20/us-usa-pakistan-
security-idUSBRE99J08H20131020 (quoting State Department spokeswoman Marie 
Harf as stating: “‘As part of our annual funding process, throughout the course of this 
past summer the State Department notified Congress of how it planned to program funds 
from several different accounts for various programs in Pakistan[.]’…’While this is part 
of a long process of restarting security assistance cooperation after implementation was 
slowed during the bilateral challenges of 2011 and 2012, civilian assistance has continued 
uninterrupted throughout….’”). See also Declan Walsh & Ismail Khan, supra note 124.
 142. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita & Alastair Smith, Political Survival and 
Endogenous Institutional Change, 42 COMP. POL. STUD. 167, 167 (2009) (arguing that 
whether democratic freedoms are suppressed in a country depends in part on the 
government’s sources of revenues. “Empirical tests show that governments with access to 
revenue sources that require few labor inputs by the citizens, such as natural resource 
rents or foreign aid, reduce the provision of public goods and increase the odds of 
increased authoritarianism in the face of revolutionary pressures.”). 
 143. This includes Pakistan’s support for the Haqqani Network, a Taliban 
affiliated group in Afghanistan, and it’s development of nuclear weapons.   
 144. Jaffrelot, supra note 140.
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has created deep-seated structural arrangements that are not easily 
unmoored.145  
Pakistan—U.S. arrangements regarding drone strikes are neither 
clearly consensual nor clearly coercive. And, there is an absence of law 
to guide us in this terrain. To what extent ought the law be sensitive to 
questions of agency, volition and duress in these bilateral arrangements 
in relation states material and political advantages and disadvantages? Or 
should the law be blind to inequalities between states, and ignore the 
costs and pressures of decisions, taking at face value the decisions of 
states as volitional? If not, what forms of pressures and incentives are 
acceptable in securing bilateral agreements? At the very least, the case 
study here puts into relief the value of sustainable bilateral relations. 
Where so much pressure is needed to secure official acquiescence that it 
results in periodic breakdowns of diplomatic relations, some pause may 
be required before reflexively finding consent, merely because the formal 
indicia of consent may be present.  
5. The Judiciary and Legislature Oppose the Continuing 
Drone Strikes... 
Making echo to the executive branch condemnation of strikes, the 
courts and the legislature have taken clear positions against drone strikes. 
In 2012, Pakistan’s Parliament has issued a series of condemnations of 
the attacks as infringements on its territory.146 One such resolution stated, 
inter alia: 
  
 145. See, e.g., AYESHA SIDDIQA, MILITARY INC. INSIDE PAKISTAN’S MILITARY 
ECONOMY (Oxford Univ. Press, 2007).
 146. “On April 12, 2012, a resolution was unanimously adopted by a joint session 
of both Houses [of parliament,] [] entitled Guidelines for Revised Terms of Engagement 
with the USA/NATO/ISAF and General Foreign Policy. The resolution begins with a 
statement that relations between Pakistan and the USA should be based upon mutual 
respect for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of each other, and inter 
alia (a) calls for an immediate cessation of drone attacks inside the territorial borders of 
Pakistan; (b) reaffirms Pakistan’s commitment to the elimination of terrorism and 
combating extremism in its own national interest; (c) provides that neither the 
Government nor any of its component entities may enter into verbal agreements with any 
other foreign Government or authority regarding national security; (d) provides that any 
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a) [The parliament] calls for an immediate cessation of drone attacks 
inside the territorial borders of Pakistan; (b) reaffirms Pakistan’s 
commitment to the elimination of terrorism and combating extremism 
in its own national interest; (c) provides that neither the Government 
nor any of its component entities may enter into verbal agreements with 
any other foreign Government or authority regarding national security[. 
. . .]”147 
This resolution was passed unanimously by Pakistan’s Parliament and 
sets out the framework for regulating the use of force by foreign states 
inside Pakistan’s territory.148 It cancels prior any oral authority that may 
be been granted to foreign states, and requires that consent in the future 
be given in in writing, subject to approval from Parliament.149  
In addition, the Peshawar High Court has ruled that the drone strikes 
violate international and domestic US law, and without Pakistan’s 
consent, in a case was brought by drone strike survivors and their 
families. On this second point, the Court found that the strikes amount to 
a “clear & naked aggression on sovereign territory/airspace of 
Pakistan.”150 The Court determined that these strikes are carried out 
without input or advice from the Pakistan government or its intelligence 
agencies. 151 After taking note of the different occasions on which 
  
such agreements previously entered into should forthwith cease to have effect; and (e) 
provides that any such agreements should, in the future, be subject to scrutiny by 
specified Ministries and Parliamentary bodies and then announced through a Ministerial 
statement in Parliament. The resolution also calls on the international community to 
recognize the human and economic losses caused to Pakistan by the so-called “war on 
terror” and affirms that “[i]n the battle for hearts and minds an inclusive process based on 
primacy of dialogue” which “respect[s] local customs, traditions, values and religious 
beliefs” should be adopted.”.  
Id.; Emerson Report, supra note 78. 
 147. Id.  
 148. Emmerson Report, supra note 78, ¶ 53-54. “The effect of the resolution was 
to clarify the process by which consent may lawfully be given in Pakistan for the 
deployment of another State’s military assets on its territory or in its airspace.” Id. ¶ 54. 
 149. Id.  
 150. Khan v. Fed’n of Pak., W.P.No. 1550-P/2012, Writ Petition No. 1551- 
P/2012, § 16 (Argued Apr. 11, 2013) (Peshawar High Court) (Dost Muhammad Khan). 
 151. Id.  
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members of Pakistan’s government have condemned the strikes, the 
Court concludes that the “only option left out is to give effective 
rejoinder to such naked aggression made on sovereign state 
territory/airspace” and to ask the Security Forces to defend against these 
strikes.152 The directions issues by the High Court’s decision have not 
been heeded, prompting the petitioners to move to file a contempt 
petition against the current prime ministers and other officials.153  
And, unlike the executive branch condemnations, these legislative and 
judicial pronouncements are less susceptible to the same corrupting 
forces. Indeed, even sustaining the contention that the executive says one 
thing in public and another in private, legislative and judicial 
condemnations of these strikes, in particular suggest that these strikes are 
done without the full support of other branches of government. Any 
agreement between the U.S. and Pakistan that may not exist is not only 
viewed as illegitimate by the wider public, but by other branches of 
government. 
The reality of civilian casualties, the frequent retaliations by militant 
groups against the Pakistani civilians for U.S. strikes and populist anti-
imperialist sentiment have solidified public opinion against these strikes, 
mirrored by recent legislative and judicial pronouncements.  
  
[T]herefore, it is held that these [strikes] are absolutely illegal & blatant 
violation of the Sovereignty of the State of Pakistan because frequent 
intrusion is made on its territory / airspace without its consent rather 
against its wishes as despite of the protests lodged by the Government of 
Pakistan with USA on the subject matter, these are being carried out with 
impunity. 
See also id. at 18. 
 152. Id.§ 17. 
 153. Ansar Abbasi, Contempt Petition Being Moved Against Nawaz Govt in PHC, 
THE NEWS INTERNATIONAL (Nov. 4, 2013),  
http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-13-26452-Contempt-petition-being-moved-
against-Nawaz-govt-in-PHC. 
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6. Yet, There Has Been Continuing Intelligence and 
Logistical Support for the Strikes... 
Despite condemnation by all three branches of government, there is 
evidence to suggest that intelligence agencies and segments of Pakistan’s 
armed forces facilitate the execution of strikes.  
Special Rapporteur Emmerson recognized that there may be 
continued authorization and support from Pakistan’s ISI.154 In addition, it 
is undisputed that the Pakistan military provides the airbase from which 
at least some UAV’s take off and land.155 And, it has been revealed that 
the ISI receives notification of the broad areas where strikes may take 
place. Since May 2011 when the U.S. conducted raid on the Abottabad 
compound, which housed Osama Bin Laden, the ISI no longer sends 
acknowledgement of receipt.156  
Yet, as a factual matter, the actions of an agency or members of an 
executive agency do not necessarily represent other branches or agencies 
of government. Indeed, the facts discussed above highlight the strong 
inter-governmental dissent on the matter. The parliamentary resolution, 
  
 154. Lawfare Podcast Episode #31: Special Edition: Ben Emmerson Discusses His 
Investigation, LAWFARE (May 14, 2013), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/05/lawfare-
podcast-episode-31-special-edition-ben-emmerson-discusses-his-investigation. 
 155. Chris Woods, CIA Drones Quit One Pakistan Site—but US Keeps Access to 
Other Airbases, THE BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM (Dec. 15, 2011),  
http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/blog/2011/12/15/cia-drones-quit-pakistan-site-but-
us-keeps-access-to-other-airbases.
 156. Entous, supra note 117 (“After the May 2011 bin Laden raid, which the U.S. 
did without Pakistani permission or knowledge, the ISI stopped acknowledging receipt of 
U.S. drone notifications, according to U.S. and Pakistani officials. Replies were stopped 
on the order of the ISI chief at that time, said an official briefed on the matter. ‘Not 
responding was their way of saying ‘we’re upset with you,’ this [unidentified U.S.] 
official said. The official said the ISI chief chose that option knowing an outright denial 
of drone permission would spark a confrontation, and also believing that withdrawing 
consent wouldn’t end the strikes.”). Jane Perlez, U.S. Push to Expand in Pakistan Meets 
Resistance, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2009),  
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/06/world/asia/06islamabad.html (“American officials 
have said that Blackwater employees worked at a remote base in Shamsi, in Baluchistan, 
where they loaded missiles and bombs onto drones used to strike Taliban and Qaeda 
militants. The operation of the drones at Shamsi had been shifted by the Americans to 
Afghanistan this year, a senior Pakistani military official said.”). 
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the High Court’s decisions demonstrate that if there is continued 
authorization or even logistical support offered in aid of US strikes, 
particularly since 2012, it is offered by state agency that it is largely 
unaccountable. These facts raise the question as to who is the proper 
state agent and proper process for negotiating consent. Can consent be 
obtained by an individual or groups in power through illegal or tenuous 
constitutional authority or through an agency that is not directly 
politically accountable?157 Furthermore, should the consent doctrine take 
into consideration intergovernmental dissent? 
Special Rapporteur Emmerson clarifies that under current 
constitutional law in Pakistan, only the “democratically elected 
Government is the body responsible for Pakistani international relations 
and the sole entity able to express the will of the State in its international 
affairs.”158 But international law does not require that a particular 
arrangement regarding interstate force comply with the host state’s 
domestic law.159 Still, he does not regard the assistance offered by 
individual Pakistani state agencies to the CIA and the U.S. over drone 
strikes as tantamount to consent. He stops short of setting forward a clear 
rule for when consent has been obtained, but concludes that currently 
Pakistan does not consent.  
But Emmerson’s report does not discuss whether there was consent 
historically, in particular before the parliamentary resolution was passed. 
While there may have been official authorization, as Musharraf himself 
admitted,160 there is still a question of whether there was legal consent at 
that time, because of who gave consent—a military dictator and under 
what circumstances—without Parliamentary approval, and with great 
pressure from the U.S. Furthermore, Pakistan’s peculiar fact pattern also 
raises the question of whether without explicit authorization, continuing 
consent can surmised, tacitly from other behaviors by the Pakistani state 
and its officials. On the one hand, we see continued logistical support to 
  
 157. Deeks, supra note 69. 
 158. Emmerson Report, supra note 78, ¶ 54. 
 159. Deeks, supra note 69, at 4. 
 160. Lawfare Podcast Episode #31: Special Edition: Ben Emmerson Discusses His 
Investigation, supra note 154. 
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U.S. drones, and on the other popular outcry and inter-governmental 
dissent.  
B. Legal Implications  
In summary, although there may have been a clear agreement between 
the two states to collaborate at one point, it seems to have degenerated 
into Pakistan’s tacit policy of non-opposition, which then perhaps 
morphed into an explicit policy of opposition. Yet, there is some 
logistical support offered by Pakistan, and no evidence of any direct 
interference. It remains unclear whether Pakistan’s civilian government 
participates in private but protests in public. However, despite 
unresolved factual issues, there are important grounds for challenging an 
affirmative finding of consent. 
In particular, the secrecy of any bilateral arrangement, widespread 
public condemnation, intra-governmental dissent, and the instability of 
the U.S.—Pakistan relationship challenge us to rethink the contours of 
consent. There are four interrelated legal issues that these facts raise. If 
the existence of an agreement is deliberately kept ambiguous to shield it 
from known opposition from the public and other branches of 
government, should it be accepted as lawfully and “validly” obtained 
consent? What kinds of domestic political arrangements that support 
interstate force agreements are normatively acceptable and which violate 
precepts of self-determination and democracy? Can a state’s non-
interference in other state’s use of force be tantamount to consent when 
its recourse to actively challenge the offending state is limited because of 
its relative weakness? Finally, if a bilateral arrangement is so precarious 
so as to lead to intermittent breakdown in bilateral relations, can there be 
continuing consent?  
VI. TOWARDS A MORE EQUITABLE DOCTRINE OF CONSENT  
The issue of Pakistan’s consent to drone strikes invites us to re-
examine the rules that give shape to the consent doctrine. Namely, it 
focuses our attention on how these rules construe two key norms in 
international law: the right to self-determination and sovereign equality.  
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The secrecy of the Pakistani government’s involvement in the drone 
program, and the result of the public and intra-governmental opposition 
to the strikes carry together implications for Pakistani citizens’ right to 
self-determination. The current arrangement, in which an agency in the 
executive is pursuing a policy at odds with domestic public opinion, and 
the position of other branches of government and executive agencies, is 
anti-democratic, substantively as well as institutionally, because it is 
immune from public accountability. If any agreement exists between the 
U.S. and Pakistan, it relies on discord, secrecy, and unaccountable 
government actors. The continuing existence of the U.S.’s drone program 
relies on an acute crisis in representation. Thus, to find consent in such a 
situation solidifies domestic political arrangements in Pakistan that are 
unpopular and not able to be challenged through the democratic process. 
The norm of self-determination has traditionally been narrowly construed 
in analyses of bilateral agreements governing the use of force. The law 
has refrained from probing the substantive popularity of an agreement, 
the extent of intra-governmental consensus over a particular bilateral 
arrangement, or robustness of the democratic processes. In addition, 
under the traditional rule, consent need only be secured by a 
representative whose decisions are considered at the international level 
“to be the will of the State and, in addition, the person in question must 
be competent to manifest that will in the particular case involved.”161 
Generally, that person is head of the central government’s executive 
branch. Popular sovereignty and the notion that final authority rests in 
the people and their demands have not prevailed as the authoritative 
standard for determining whether consent is valid.  
Undeniably, the dominant legal interpretations of consent and self-
determination serve the interests of finality and determinacy, because the 
inquiry into the legitimacy of the consenting actor is relatively limited, 
and because the substantive legitimacy or illegitimacy of a particular 
bilateral policy is largely unregulated.162  But in the case of Pakistan, the 
  
 161. Eighth Rep., supra note 92, ¶ 70. 
 162. See Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary 
International Law, 84 AM. J. INT’L L. 866, 876 (1990) (recognizing that using the metric 
of popular sovereignty to determine whether sovereignty has been violated is a more 
difficult inquiry):  
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rule of “effective control” is difficultly applied. The persistence of 
assistance for drone strikes by intelligence agencies, in the face of 
frequent condemnation of strikes from all branches of government, and 
the possibility that the state may be strategically ambiguous itself makes 
it difficult to discern the true intentions of the state’s international 
representatives. Do we rely on the actions of intelligence agencies or the 
words of the Prime Minister? In addition, there is the risk that state actors 
authorizing the use of force are domestically unaccountable, yet propped 
up by a foreign force, giving a foreign country greater control over 
domestic policies than its citizens. Furthermore, the kind of discord and 
inconsistences upon which the US drone program in Pakistan is presently 
predicated calls into question whether consent should only be given by 
the executive branch. Finally, those particular circumstances invite us to 
examine into the benefits of broadening the consent inquiry by 
considering other branches of government and expressions of popular 
support or condemnation for a more holistic and grounded sense of 
consent. Whereas the executive may be deliberately ambiguous about its 
position, public opinion is not in Pakistan.163 
A more sensitive rule would require investigation into the popularity, 
the legitimacy a particular bilateral agreement enjoys, and its status in 
domestic law.164 This would ensure that bilateral force agreements are 
consonant with the right to self-determination, writ large, and not merely 
  
Because human rights considerations introduce so many more variables 
into the determination of lawfulness, an even heavier burden of 
deliberation devolves upon international lawyers in assessing the 
lawfulness of actions. Matters become more complex and uncertain than 
they were in an international legal system that was composed of a few 
binary rules applied to a checkerboard of monarchical states and, most 
particularly, that lacked an international code of human rights. One can 
no longer simply condemn externally motivated actions aimed at 
removing an unpopular government and permitting the consultation or 
implementation of the popular will as per se violations of sovereignty 
without inquiring whether and under what conditions that will was being 
suppressed, and how the external action will affect the expression and 
implementation of popular sovereignty. The identification of what is 
clearly ‘externally motivated action’ is itself an increasingly difficult task.  
Id. 
 163. See Mazzetti, supra note 117; see also supra note 117. 
 164. See Deeks, supra note 69. 
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in a formal and procedural way. Examining more closely, the legitimacy 
of a particular agreement has a better chance of securing the norm of 
sovereign equality, as well, because such a rule pays attention to the 
wishes of the people, not merely the actions of isolated government 
actors, who, as in the case of Pakistan’s ISI, are propped up and 
supported by a foreign government.  
Furthermore, the law makes clear that consent cannot be presumed ,165 
for example from a state’s inaction, as the US may do from Pakistan’s 
policy of non-interference. This policy of non-interference must be 
viewed in the context of Pakistan’s precarious relationship with the U.S. 
Indeed, precarious agreements, particularly ones between donor states 
and aid dependent states, highlight the unrealistic expectation that later 
are able to fully represent and enforce their wishes in bilateral 
negotiations. To ignore inequalities in the negotiation process can 
reproduce them, as weaker states are bound by agreements in which its 
aspirations are not fully represented, and thus, compromising its 
existential sovereignty. Probing the power dynamics between states 
rather than their presuming equal capacity runs against conventional 
understandings of sovereignty, which permits states to consent to any 
agreement, even if it unfavorable or unfair, on the ground that a state is 
prima facie sovereign and master of its own destiny. A rule that is more 
conscious of power and histories of imperialism would consider the 
incentives offered and pressures placed in order to secure consent and the 
constraints on agency of weaker states. Such a rule may offer a 
corrective to the strong current in international law that has strengthened 
interstate hierarchy. The precarious agreement also suggests that bilateral 
force agreements be periodically revaluated to ensure that consent has 
been validly obtained. Consent must be viewed not as a single instance in 
which parties agree to cooperate but part of a sequence of negotiations 
over a course of time. Periodic breakdown in bilateral relations weakens 
the case for continued consent because the agreement is not sustainable 
and raises questions of coercion. 
If international law has operated to enhance rather than correct inter-
state inequality, it is partly because it has foreclosed alternative, more 
  
 165. See DARS, supra note 79, art. 20 cmt. n. 6. 
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expansive understandings of sovereign equality and self-determination. 
The suggestions made here would replace formalist interpretative 
practices with ones open to greater nuance and flexibility. International 
legal norms need not be static. Arguably, change is built into the law’s 
interpretive processes.166  
 
  
 166. See Saul, supra note 38, at 610. 
